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SUMMARY
In this thesis, we do an algorithmic study of optimization problems in budgeted
auctions, and some well known covering problems in the multi-agent setting. We
give new results for the design of approximation algorithms, online algorithms and
hardness of approximation for these problems. Along the way we give new insights
for many other related problems.
Budgeted Auctions. We study the following allocation problem which arises in
budgeted auctions: Given a set of m indivisible items and n agents; agent i is willing
to pay bij for item j and has an overall budget of Bi (i.e. the maximum total amount
agent i is willing to pay). The goal is to allocate items to the agents so as to maximize
the total revenue obtained.
We give two approximation algorithms with 3/4-approximation factor, improving
upon the previous best known factor of ' 0.632. We use linear programming based
techniques, and our approximation ratio is optimal in the sense that it matches the
integrality gap of the linear program used by us and by the other authors [24, 2, 3]. We
also show hardness of approximation factor of 15/16 for the above problem, and use
our techniques to improve the hardness results for other related allocation problems.
We also study the above allocation problem in an online setting. Online version of
the problem has motivation in Ad Auctions which are run by search engines such as
Google, Microsoft Live, Yahoo!. Previously, the online version was mostly studied in
the worst-case setting. But in applications such as Ad Auctions it is unlikely to see a
worst-case sequence of items as input. Motivated by this, we study the online version
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of the problem in which the items arrive in a random order i.e. the set of items are
adversarially chosen but the order in which they arrive is random. Our main result is
an analysis to show that a natural greedy algorithm has a competitive ratio of 1−1/e
in this model, which we also show to be tight.
Lastly, we define a new bidding language for budgeted auctions- Decreasing valu-
ation bids. We make a case for why this language is better both for the sellers and
the buyers.
Multi-agent Covering Problems. To motivate this class of problems, consider the
network design problem of constructing a spanning tree of a graph, assuming that
there are many agents willing to construct different parts of the tree. The cost of
each agent for constructing a particular set of edges could be a complicated function.
For instance, some agents might provide discounts depending on how many edges
they construct. The algorithmic question that one would be interested in is: Can one
find a spanning tree of minimum cost in polynomial time in these complex settings?
Note that such an algorithm will have to find a spanning tree, and partition its edges
among the agents.
Above are the type of questions that we are trying to answer for various com-
binatorial problems. We look at the case when the agents’ cost functions are sub-
modular. A function f : 2X → R is said to be submodular if, for all S, T ⊆ X,
f(S ∩ T ) + f(S ∪ T ) ≤ f(S) + f(T ). Submodular functions form a rich class and
capture the natural properties of economies of scale or the law of diminishing returns.
Based on these considerations, we define the following general class of problems - We
are given a set of elements X (|X| = n) and a collection C ⊆ 2X . Here the collection
C is given via some combinatorial structure like a matroid or a graph property (for
instance the set of all spanning trees in a graph G with edge set X). We are also
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given k agents, where each agent i specifies a non-decreasing submodular cost func-
tion fi : 2
X → R+. The goal is to find a set S ∈ C and a partition S1, ..., Sk of S such
that
∑
i fi(Si) is minimized. Note that one can study various covering type problems
in this setting by suitably defining the collection set C.
We study the following fundamental problems in this setting- Vertex Cover, Span-
ning Tree, Perfect Matching, Reverse Auctions. We look at both the single agent and
the multi-agent case, and study the approximability of each of these problems. The
approximation ratio(upper bound) and the hardness of approximation(lower bound)
for each of these problems is presented in the table below.
Table 1: Results
Single-agent Multi-agent
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Reverse Auction 1 1 Ω(log n) O(min(k, log n))
Vertex Cover 2− ε 2 Ω(log n) O(log n)
Perfect Matching Ω(n) O(n) Ω(n) O(n)




Algorithm Design is the field of designing step-by-step procedures to achieve certain
outcome. One typical and important characteristic requirement is that the algorithm
be efficient i.e. it takes small number of steps. Formalism of the notion of efficient
algorithms has made a significant impact in many areas, besides Computer Science,
such as Operations Research, Economics, Game Theory, etc. The proof for existence
and non-existence of such algorithms typically involves deeper understanding of the
problem at hand, thus giving valuable insights for both theory and practice.
In this thesis, we do an algorithmic study of optimization problems in budgeted
auctions, and some well known covering problems in the multi-agent setting. We
design approximation algorithms, online algorithms and show hardness of approxi-
mation for these problems. Along the way we give new insights for many other related
problems.
1.1 Budgeted Auctions
Budgeted Auction is an auction setting where we are given a set of m indivisible
items and n agents who are interested in the items; agent i bids bij on item j (i.e.
the maximum amount agent i is willing to pay for item j) and has an overall budget
of Bi (i.e. the maximum total amount “he” is willing to pay).
Examples of such auctions include those used for the privatization of public assets
in western Europe (see, for example [6]), or those for the distribution of radio spectra
in the US, where the magnitude of the transactions involved put financial or liquidity
constraints on bidders. With the growth of the Internet, budget-constrained auctions
have become increasingly relevant. Firstly, e-auctions held on the web (on e-Bay,
1
for instance) cater to the long-tail of users who are inherently budget-constrained.
Secondly, sponsored search auctions hosted by search engines (Google, Yahoo!, MSN
and the like) where advertisers bid on keywords include budget specification as a
feature. Google also uses budgeted auctions to sell advertisement spaces on more
traditional media such as radio and television 1.
A typical goal of the seller is to allocate items to the agents so as to maximize the
total revenue. In this work, we focus our attention on the computational complexity
of this revenue maximizing problem. Note that we do not consider the strategic
nature of the agents (In general, the agents are strategic players who might lie on the
bids or the budgets to maximize their own gains). We will denote this non-strategic
optimization problem of budgeted auctions by budgeted allocation.
We study budgeted allocation problem in both the offline and the online setting.
In the online setting, we will assume that the bids of advertisers are much smaller as
compared to the budgets. This is a common (and natural) assumption made in the
context of sponsored search auctions, which motivated the study of online budgeted
allocation problem.
1.2 Multi-agent Submodular Covering Problems
A multitude of fundamental computational problems with real-world applications can
be cast in the following framework: We are given a set X of elements, a collection
C of subsets of X (i.e. C ⊆ 2X) and a cost function f over the subsets of X. The
collection C is typically specified via a combinatorial structure like a matroid or a
graph property (for instance, the set of all spanning trees in a graph). The objective
is to select a set S ∈ C that minimizes f(S).
A major focus in theoretical computer science has been on linear cost functions.
1see for instance http://www.google.com/adwords/audioads/ and http://www.google.com/adwords/tvads
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The study of combinatorial problems with linear cost functions has led to great de-
velopments in the theory of exact and approximation algorithms. However, linear
cost functions do not always model the complex dependencies of the costs in a real-
world setting. Often, they only serve as an approximation to the original functions.
As a result, even though we might have a good algorithm for solving some linear
optimization problem, the lack of accurate input might lead to sub-optimality of the
solution.
Another feature that arises in a real-world setting is the presence of multiple
agents, where each agent has his own cost function. Thus, in the optimal solution,
each agent might build only a part of the required combinatorial structure. For
example, the Internet is a complex multi-agent system where each service provider
owns only a part of the network. For linear cost functions, it is easy to see that having
multiple agents does not change the complexity of the original problem. However,
this is not the case for more general cost functions.
Motivated by these considerations, we define the following class of combinatorial
problems with multi-agent submodular cost function (MSCP) problems - We are given
a set of elements X (|X| = n) and a collection C ⊆ 2X . We are also given k
agents, where each agent i specifies a normalized (meaning fi(φ) = 0) non-decreasing
submodular cost function fi : 2
X → R+. The goal is to find a set S ∈ C and a
partition S1, ..., Sk of S such that
∑
i fi(Si) is minimized.
We study the following fundamental problems in this setting- Vertex Cover, Span-
ning Tree, Perfect Matching, Reverse Auctions. We look at both the single agent and
the multi-agent case, and study the approximability of each of these problems. We
assume that the submodular functions are given via a value oracle, i.e. given a set S,
the oracle returns the value f(S).
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1.3 Contributions, Credits, and Organization of the thesis
1.3.1 Budgeted Auctions
As mentioned earlier we study the non-game theoretic maximum budgeted allocation
(MBA) problem which arises in budgeted auctions.
In Chapter 2, we look at the offline version of the problem, i.e. when all the items
are known. This is joint work with Deeparnab Chakrabarty [13] (Also appeared in
the Ph.D. thesis of Chakrabarty [12]). We give two approximation algorithms for
maximum budgeted allocation. The first, based on iterative LP rounding, attains a
factor of 3/4. The second algorithm, based on the primal-dual schema, is faster and
attains a factor of (3/4)(1−ε), for any ε > 0. The running time of the latter algorithm
is Õ(nm
ε
), and is thus almost linear for constant ε and dense instances. Our algorithms
are optimal for the LP that we consider, as there is an example with an integrality
gap of 3/4. Our algorithms can be extended to give a 1− β/4 factor approximation
algorithm, when the ratio of bid to budget is at most β, where 0 < β ≤ 1 (We call
this problem β-MBA).
We also show that it is NP hard to approximate MBA to a factor better than 15/16.
Our hardness reductions extend to give a (1 − β/16) hardness for β-MBA as well.
Interestingly, our reductions can be used to obtain better inapproximability results
for other problems: Submodular Welfare Maximization (15/16 hardness even with
demand queries), Generalized Assignment Problem (10/11 hardness) and Maximum
Spanning Star Forest(10/11 and 13/14 for the edge and node weighted versions).
Previous to our work, MBA was noted to be NP-hard and this observation was
made concurrently by many authors ([24, 2, 45]). The first approximation algorithm
for the problem was given by Garg, Kumar and Pandit[24] who gave a 2/(1 +
√
5) ('
0.618) factor approximation. Andelman and Mansour[2] improved the factor to (1−
1/e) (' 0.632). For the special case when budgets of all bidders were equal, [2]
improved the factor to 0.717. Recently, and independent of our work, Azar et.al. [3]
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obtained a 2/3-factor algorithm for the general MBA problem (Arvind Srinivasan [59]
improved the algorithm to get a factor 3/4, same as ours). They also considered a
uniform version of the problem where for every item j, the bid of any agent is either
bj (independent of the agent) or 0. They gave a 1/
√
2 (' 0.707) factor for the same.
Because of the applications in sponsored search auctions, MBA (or rather β-MBA
with β → 0 which is a standard assumption in such auctions) is also considered in
an online setting, i.e. when items arrive one by one, and they have to be allocated as
soon as they arrive. Mehta et.al.[48] and later, Buchbinder et.al.[9] gave (1 − 1/e)-
competitive algorithms for the worst case scenario when each arriving item is chosen
adversarially. Simple Greedy, which assigns the item to the highest bidder with
remaining budget, has a competitive ratio of 1/2. In spite of the elegance and optimal
competitive ratio of this algorithm, there remains some dissatisfaction with the use
of worst case analysis in that we are unlikely to see a worst-case sequence of items as
input.
Motivated by above considerations, in Chapter 3, we study the online budgeted
allocation problem in which the items arrive in a random order, i.e. the set of items
are adversarially chosen but the order in which they arrive is random. This is joint
work with Aranyak Mehta [26].
Our main result is an analysis to show that Greedy has competitive ratio 1− 1/e
in the random permutation input model. We also show that our analysis is tight by
providing examples in the two models for which Greedy has ratio exactly 1 − 1/e.
We also extend these results for the i.i.d. model in which there is an unknown
distribution on items, and the next item in the sequence is picked independently from
this distribution. Along the way, we provide a first correct proof for the RANKING
algorithm of [37] for the online bipartite matching problem.
In Chapter 4, we study a new bidding model for the sponsored search auctions –
decreasing valuation bids. This provides a richer language than the current model for
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advertisers to convey their preferences. This is also a joint work with Aranyak Mehta
[25].
Better expressivity is clearly better for the bidder (as long as the language remains
simple enough to understand). Intuitively, it is clear that the bidders will now be able
to bid with more control and therefore face less risk, and will bid more aggressively.
This is clearly better for the search engine, in terms of the optimal profit (OPT) deriv-
able from the bidders. But what if the bidding language introduces computationally
difficult problems for the search engine? Then it will not be able to efficiently extract
a good portion of the OPT as profit. We show that our models do not introduce such
computational difficulties, by describing optimal algorithms whose competitive ratio
is 1− 1/e, as good as that of the optimal algorithm [48] in the standard model.
We also show that our bidding language is at the correct trade-off point between
expressivity, simplicity and computational efficiency. Simple generalizations of our
bidding model (by adding more expressivity) result in computational problems for
which no algorithms can perform better than a factor of 1/2, and for which the
natural Greedy algorithm has an arbitrarily bad factor.
1.3.2 Multi-agent Submodular Covering Problem
The following contribution is described in chapter 5. In a joint work with Chinmay
Karande, Pushkar Tripathi, and Lei Wang, we give an approximation algorithm and a
matching information theoretic lower bound for each of the subclass of problems that
we mentioned earlier. We present the approximation ratio (both upper and lower
bound) for each of these problems in the table below. Upper bound of log n was
previously known for Reverse Auctions[30].
Quite surprisingly, Perfect Matching and Spanning Tree, which are polytime solv-
able in the linear cost setting, become extremely hard when the cost functions are
submodular. On the other hand, Vertex Cover retains its factor 2 approximation
6
Single-agent Multi-agent
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Reverse Auction 1 1 Ω(log n) O(min(k, log n))
Vertex Cover 2− ε 2 Ω(log n) O(log n)
Perfect Matching Ω(n) O(n) Ω(n) O(n)
Spanning Tree Ω(n) O(n) Ω(n) O(n)
ratio. Note that factor 2 − ε hardness of approximation for Vertex Cover is a long
standing open question in the classical linear cost setting. Our results implies that,
if the cost function over the set of vertices is submodular, which is the first natural
generalization of linear costs, then the optimal approximation factor is indeed 2.
Our algorithms are either based on greedy methods, or rounding of Configurational




BUDGETED ALLOCATION: OFFLINE CASE
In this chapter, we study the approximability of maximum budgeted allocation prob-
lem and improve upon the best known approximation and hardness of approximation
factors. Moreover, we use our hardness reductions to get better hardness results for
other allocation problems like submodular welfare maximization(SWM), generalized
assignment problem (GAP) and maximum spanning star-forest (MSSF).
We start with the formal problem definition of maximum budgeted allocation(MBA).
Definition 1 Let Q and A be a set of m indivisible items and n agents respectively,
with agent i willing to pay bij for item j. Each agent i has a budget constraint
Bi and on receiving a set S ⊆ Q of items, pays min(Bi,
∑
j∈S bij). An allocation
Γ : A → 2Q is the partitioning the sets of items Q into disjoint sets Γ(1), · · · ,Γ(n).
The maximum budgeted allocation problem, or simply MBA, is to find the allocation





Note that we can assume without loss of generality that bij ≤ Bi, ∀i ∈ A, j ∈ Q.
This is because if bids are larger than budget, decreasing it to the budget does not
change the value of any allocation. Sometimes, motivated by the application, one can
add the constraint that bij ≤ β · Bi for all i ∈ A and j ∈ Q, for some β ≤ 1. We call
such an instance β-MBA.
As mentioned earlier, the problem naturally arises as a revenue maximization
problem for the auctioneer in an auction with budgeted agents. Examples of such
auctions (see, for example [6]) include those used for the privatization of public assets
in western Europe, or those for the distribution of radio spectra in the US, where
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the magnitude of the transactions involved put financial or liquidity constraints on
bidders. With the growth of the Internet, budget-constrained auctions have gained
increasing relevance. Firstly, e-auctions held on the web (on e-Bay, for instance) cater
to the long-tail of users who are inherently budget-constrained. Secondly, sponsored
search auctions hosted by search engines (Google, Yahoo!, MSN and the like) where
advertisers bid on keywords include budget specification as a feature. A common
(and natural) assumption in keyword auctions that is typically made is that bids
of advertisers are much smaller than the budgets. However, with the extension of
the sponsored search medium from the web onto the more classical media, such as
radio and television1 where this assumption is not as reasonable, the general budget-
constrained auctions need to be addressed.
Previous and Related Work: MBA is known to be NP-hard as it encodes
Partition 2, and this observation was made concurrently by many authors ([24, 54,
2, 45]). The first approximation algorithm for the problem was given by Garg, Kumar
and Pandit[24] who gave a 2/(1 +
√
5)(' 0.618) factor approximation. Andelman
and Mansour[2] improved the factor to (1− 1/e)(' 0.632). For the special case when
budgets of all bidders were equal, [2] improved the factor to 0.717. Very recently, and
independent of our work, Azar et.al. [3] obtained a 2/3-factor for the general MBA
problem. They also considered a uniform version of the problem where for every item
j, the bid of any agent is either bj (independent of the agent) or 0. They gave a
1/
√
2(' 0.707) factor for the same. All these algorithms are based on a natural LP
relaxation (LP(1) in Section 2.0.4) which we use as well.
In the setting of sponsored search auctions, MBA, or rather β-MBA with β → 0,
has been studied mainly in an online context. Mehta et.al.[48] and later, Buchbinder
et.al.[9] gave (1 − 1/e)-competitive algorithms when the assumption of bids being
1see for instance http://www.google.com/adwords/audioads/ and http://www.google.com/adwords/tvads
2Partition: Given n integers a1, · · · , an and a target B, decide whether there is a subset of
these integers adding up to exactly B
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small to budget is made. The dependence of the factor on β is not quite clear from
either of the works. Moreover, as per our knowledge, nothing better was known the
approximability of the offline β-MBA than what was suggested by algorithms for
MBA.
Our results: We give two approximation algorithms for MBA. The first, based on
iterative LP rounding, attains a factor of 3/4. The algorithm described in Section
2.1. The second algorithm, based on the primal-dual schema, is faster and attains a
factor of 3/4(1− ε), for any ε > 0. The running time of the algorithm is Õ(nm
ε
)3, and
is thus almost linear for constant ε and dense instances. We describe the algorithm
in Section 2.2. Our algorithms can be extended suitably for β-MBA as well giving a
1− β/4 factor approximation algorithm.
In Section 2.3, we show it is NP hard to approximate MBA to a factor better
than 15/16 via a gap-preserving reduction from Max-3-Lin(2). Our hardness in-
stances are uniform in the sense of Azar et.al. [3] implying uniform MBA is as hard.
Our hardness reductions extend to give a (1 − β/16) hardness for β-MBA as well.
Interestingly, our reductions can be used to obtain better inapproximability results
for other problems: SWM (15/16 hardness even with demand queries), GAP (10/11
hardness) and MSSF(10/11 and 13/14 for the edge and node weighted versions),
which we elaborate below.
2.0.3 Relations to other allocation problems
Submodular Welfare Maximization (SWM): As in the definition of MBA, let
Q be a set of m indivisible items and A be a set of n agents. For agent i, let
ui : 2
Q → R+ be a utility function where for a subset of items S ⊆ Q, ui(S) denote
the utility obtained by agent i when S is allocated to it. Given an allocation of items
3the˜hides logarithmic factors
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to agents, the total social welfare is the sum of utilities of the agents. The welfare
maximization problem is to find an allocation of maximum social welfare. We assume
the existence of a demand oracle: for any agent i and prices p1, p2, · · · , pm for all
items in Q, returns a subset S ⊆ Q which maximizes (ui(S)−
∑
j∈S pj).
Welfare maximization problems have been extensively studied (see, for example,
[7]) in the past few years with various assumptions made on the utility functions. One
important set of utility functions are monotone submodular utility functions. A utility
function ui is submodular if for any two subsets S, T of items, ui(S∪T )+ui(S∩T ) ≤
ui(S) + ui(T ). The welfare maximization problem when all the utility functions are
submodular is called the submodular welfare maximization problem or simply SWM.
Feige and Vondrak [20] gave an (1−1/e+ρ)-approximation for SWM with ρ ∼ 0.0001
and showed that it is NP-hard to approximate SWM to better than 275/276.4
MBA is a special case of SWM. This follows from the observation that the utility
function ui(S) = min(Bi,
∑
j∈S bij) when Bi, bij’s are fixed is a submodular function.
In Section 2.3.1, we show that in the hardness instances of MBA, the demand oracle
can be simulated in poly-time and therefore the 15/16 hardness of approximation for
MBA implies a 15/16-hardness of approximation for SWM as well.
Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP): GAP is a problem quite related to
MBA: Every item j, along with the bid (profit) bij for agent (bin) i, also has an
inherent size sij. Instead of a budget constraint, each agent (bin) has a capacity
constraint Ci which defines feasible sets: A set S is feasible for (bin) i if
∑
j∈S sij ≤ Ci.
The goal is to find a revenue (profit) maximizing feasible assignment. The main
difference between GAP and MBA is that in GAP we are not allowed to violate
capacity constraints, while in MBA the budget constraint only caps the revenue. As
4We remark that SWM with a different oracle, the value oracle, has recently been resolved.
There was a (1− 1/e) hardness given by Khot et.al.[38] and recently Vondrak[64] gave a matching
polynomial time algorithm.
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was noted by Chekuri and Khanna[14], a 1/2 approximation algorithm was implicit in
the work of Shmoys and Tardos[57]. The factor was improved by Fleischer et.al.[23] to
1− 1/e. In the same paper [20] where they give the best known algorithm for SWM,
Feige and Vondrák[20] also give a (1− 1/e+ ρ′) algorithm for GAP (ρ′ ≤ 10−5). The
best known hardness for GAP was 1− ε, for some small ε which was given by Chekuri
and Khanna [14] via a reduction from maximum 3D-matching. Improved hardness
results for maximum 3D matching by Chlebik and Chlebikova[16], imply a 422/423
hardness for GAP.
Although MBA and GAP are in some sense incomparable problems, we can use
our hardness techniques to get a 10/11 factor hardness of approximation for GAP in
Section 2.3.3.
Maximum Spanning Star-Forest Problem (MSSF): Given an undirected un-
weighted graph G, the MSSF problem is to find a forest with as many edges such
that each tree in the forest is a star - all but at most one vertex of the tree are leaves.
The edge-weighted MSSF is the natural generalization with weights on edges. The
node-weighted MSSF has weights on vertices and the weight of a star is the weight
on the leaves. If the star is just an edge, then the weight of the star is the maximum
of the weights of the end points.
The unweighted and edge-weighted MSSF was introduced by Nguyen et.al [50] who
gave a 3/5 and 1/2-approximation respectively for the problems. They also showed
APX hardness of the unweighted version. Chen et.al. [15] improved the factor of
unweighted MSSF to 0.71 and introduced node-weighted MSSF giving a 0.64 factor
algorithm for it. They also give a 31/32 and 19/20 hardness for the node-weighted
and edge-weighted MSSF problems.
Although, at the face of it, MSSF does not seem to have a relation with MBA, once
again our hardness technique can be used to improve the hardness of node-weighted
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and edge-weighted MSSF to 13/14 and 10/11, respectively.
2.0.4 The LP Relaxation for MBA










xij ≤ 1,∀j; xij ∈ {0, 1} }
Relaxing the integrality constraints to non-negativity constraints gives an LP relax-
ation for the problem. We work with the following equivalent LP relaxation of the
problem. The equivalence follows by noting that in there exists an optimal fractional
solution, Bi ≥
∑
j∈Q bijxij. This was noted by Andelman and Mansour[2] and a




bijxij : ∀i ∈ A,
∑
j∈Q




∀i ∈ A, j ∈ Q, xij ≥ 0} (1)
We remark that the assumption bij ≤ Bi is crucial for this LP to be of any use.
Without this assumption it is easy to construct examples having arbitrarily high
integrality gaps. Consider the instance with one item, n agents each having a budget
1 but bidding n on the item. The LP has a solution of value n while the maximum
welfare is obviously 1.
2.0.5 Technical Contributions
Apart from being an important problem in its own right, we believe the MBA problem
is interesting as it allows us to enhance certain algorithmic ideas. As we mention
above, one of our algorithms is an iterative rounding algorithm using LP(1). Recently,
the technique of iterative rounding has achieved considerable success in designing
approximation algorithms [35, 58, 44]. However, these successes have been limited
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to minimization problems, and as per our knowledge, this work is the first iterative
rounding based result for a natural maximization problem.
The iterative rounding schema can be broadly described in the following two step
procedure: find an optimal solution satisfying some desirable property (for instance,
some variable has value 1 or at least 1/2 ([35])), then move to a residual problem
after rounding some variables to 1 and iterate. The proof of approximation factor,
say α > 1, is shown by proving that the cost incurred by the algorithm in one iteration
is at most α times the drop in the LP-value across the iteration.
In minimization problems, the constraints on the variables are normally covering
constraints. Thus, a solution to the original problem is also a solution to the natural
residual problem obtained after rounding up. The non-trivial part of most algorithms
([35, 58, 44]) lies in proving the existence of a desirable property.
In this problem, the desirable property as we show later (and this has been known
for some time) is that xij = 1 for some agent i and item j. However, in the natural
residual problem obtained after the item j is allocated to agent i, the LP might drop
by as much as twice as the value obtained by the algorithm (giving only a 1/2 factor).
To overcome this difficulty, we show how to move to a residual problem in a non-trivial
manner which allows us to control the LP-drop across iterations. We give the details
in Section 2.1. We believe this technique of a clever definition of the residual problem
might be an approach towards iterative rounding of other maximization problems like
SWM and GAP. That said, it is also non-trivial for such problems even to get the de-
sirable property of a solution; in fact it is unclear what a desirable property should be.
We also give a primal-dual algorithm for MBA in Section 2.2 which for any ε > 0
gives a 3
4
(1 − ε) approximation factor. Primal-dual algorithms have been successful
in obtaining approximation algorithms for minimization problems (whose duals are
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maximization). The typical schema is to start with an all-zeroes feasible dual solu-
tion and then raising the duals till some dual constraint goes tight which suggests the
primal variable to pick. Since MBA is a maximization problem, the dual is a min-
imization and the all-zeroes solution is not feasible any more. We deviate from the
schema by setting a subset of dual variables to zero and raising these variables. The
remaining dual variables are set so as to maintain dual feasibility. We believe that
our method of identifying the correct dual variables to work with might be applicable
for other maximization problems as well.
2.1 An iterative rounding algorithm for MBA
Let P be a problem instance defined by the bids and budgets of every agent, that is
P := ({bij}i,j, {Bi}i). With P , we associate a bipartite graph G(P) = (A ∪ Q,E),
with (i, j) ∈ E if i bids on j.
Let x∗(P) be an extreme point solution to LP(1) for the problem instance P . For
brevity, we omit writing the dependence on P when the instance is clear from context.
Let E∗ be the support of the solution, that is E∗ := {(i, j) ∈ E : x∗ij > 0}. Note
that these are the only important edges - one can discard all bids of agents i on item
j when (i, j) /∈ E∗. This does not change the LP optimum and a feasible integral
solution in this instance is a feasible solution of the original instance. Call the set of





The starting point of the algorithm is the following claim about the structure of
the extreme point solution. Such an argument using polyhedral combinatorics, was
first used in the machine scheduling paper of Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos [46]. A
similar claim can be found in the thesis of Andelman [1].
Claim 2.1.1 The graph, G[E∗], induced by E∗ can be assumed to be a forest. More-
over, except for at most one, all the leaves of a connected component are items. Also
at most one agent in a connected component can be non-tight.
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Proof: Consider the graph G[E∗]. Without loss of generality assume that it is a
single connected component. Otherwise we can treat every connected component as
a separate instance and argue on each of them separately. Thus, G[E∗] has (n + m)
nodes. Also since there are (n+m) constraints in the LP which are not non-negativity
constraints, therefore support of any extreme point solution can be of size atmost
(n + m). This follows from simple polyhedral combinatorics: at an extreme point,
the number of inequalities going tight is at least the number of variables. Since there
are only (n+m) constraints which are not non-negativity constraints, all but at most
(n + m) variables must satisfy the non-negativity constraints with equality, that is,
should be 0. Thus |E∗| ≤ n+m.
Hence there is at most one cycle in G[E∗]. Suppose the cycle is: (i1, j1, i2, j2, · · · ,
jk, i1), where {i1, · · · , ik} and {j1, · · · , jk} are the subsets of agents and items respec-
tively. Consider the feasible fractional solution obtained by decreasing x∗ on (i1, j1) by
ε1 and increasing on (i2, j1) by ε1, decreasing on (i2, j1) by ε2 , increasing on (i2, j1) by
ε2, and so on. Note that if the εi’s are small enough, the item constraints are satisfied.
The relation between ε1 and ε2 (and cascading to other εr’s) is: ε1bi2,j1 = ε2bi2,j2 , that
is, the fraction of money spent by i2 on j1 equals the money freed by j2. The excep-
tion is the last εk, which might not satisfy the condition with ε1. If εkbi1,jk > ε1bi1,j1 ,
then just stop the increase on the edge (i1, jk) to the point where there is equality. If
εkbi1,jk < ε1bi1,j1 , then start the whole procedure by increasing x
∗ on the edge (i1, j1)
instead of decreasing and so on. In one of the two cases, we will get a feasible solution
of equal value and the εi’s can be so scaled so as to reduce x
∗ on one edge to 0. In
other words, the cycle is broken without decreasing the LP value.
Thus, G[E∗] is a tree. Moreover, since (n+m− 1) edges are positive, there must
be (n+m− 1) equalities among the budget and the item constraints. Thus at most
one budget constraint can be violated which implies at most one agent can non tight.
Now since the bids are less than the budget, therefore if an agent is a leaf of the tree
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G[E∗] then he must be non-tight. Hence atmost one agent can be a leaf of the tree
G[E∗].
2
Call an item a leaf item, if it is a leaf in G[E∗]. Also call an agent i a leaf agent
if, except for at most one, all of his neighboring items in E∗(P) are leaves. Note the
above claim implies each connected component has at least one leaf item and one leaf
agent: in any tree there are two leaves both of which cannot be agents, and there
must be an agent with all but one of its neighbors leaves and thus leaf items. For
the sake of understanding, we first discuss the following natural iterative algorithm
which assigns the leaf items to their neighbors and then adjusts the budget and bids
to get a new residual problem.
1/2-approx algorithm: Solve LP (P) to get x∗(P). Now pick a leaf agent i. Assign
all the leaf items in Γ(i) to i. Let j be the unique non-leaf item (if any) in Γ(i).
Form the new instance P ′ by removing Γ(i) \ j and all incident edges from P ′. Let
b =
∑
l∈Γ(i)\j bil, be the portion of budget spent by i. Now modify the budget of i
and his bid on j in P ′ as follows: B′i := Bi− b, and b′ij := min(bij, B′i). Its instructive
to note the drop (bij − b′ij) is at most b. (We use here the assumption bids are always
smaller than budgets). Iterate on the instance P ′.
The above algorithm is a 1/2-approximation algorithm. In every iteration, we
show that the revenue generated by the items allocated is at least 1/2 of the drop
in the LP value (LP (P) − LP (P ′)). Suppose in some iteration, i be the leaf agent
chosen, and let j be the its non-leaf neighbor, and let the revenue generated by al-
gorithm be b. Note that x∗, the solution to P , restricted to the edges in P ′ is still
a feasible solution. Thus the drop in the LP is: b + (bij − b′ij)xij. Since (bij − b′ij) is
atmost b, and xij at most 1, we get LP (P)− LP (P ′) ≤ 2b.
17
To prove a better factor in the analysis, one way is to give a better bound on the
drop, (LP (P)−LP (P ′)). Unfortunately, the above analysis is almost tight and there
exists an example where the LP drop in the first iteration is ' twice the revenue
generated by the algorithm in that iteration. Thus, for an improved analysis for this
algorithm, one needs a better amortized analysis across different iterations rather than
analyzing iteration-by-iteration. This seems non-trivial as we solve the LP again at
each iteration and the solutions could be very different across iterations making it
harder to analyze over iterations.
Instead, we modify the above algorithm by defining the residual problem P ′ in
an non-trivial manner. After assigning leaf items to agent i, we do not decrease the
budget by the amount assigned, but keep it a little “larger”. Thus these agents lie
about their budgets in the subsequent rounds, and we call these lying agents. Since
the budget doesn’t drop too much, the LP value of the residual problem doesn’t drop
much either. A possible trouble would arise when items are being assigned to lying
agents since they do not pay as much as they have bid. This leads to a trade-off and
we show by suitably modifying the residual problem one can get a 3/4 approximation.
We now elaborate.
Given a problem instance P0 := P , the algorithm proceeds in stages producing newer
instances at each stage. On going from Pi to Pi+1, at least one item is allocated
to some agent. Items are never de-allocated, thus the process ends in at most m
stages. The value of an item is defined to be the payment made by the agent who
gets it. That is, value(j) = min(bij, Bi − spent(i)), where spent(i) is the value of
items allocated to i at the time j was being allocated. We will always ensure the
condition that a lying agent i bids on at most one item j. We will call j the false
item of i and the bid of i on j to be i’s false bid. In the beginning no agent is lying.
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We now describe the k-th iteration of the iterative algorithm which we call MBA-
Iter (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 k-th step of MBA-Iter
1. Solve LP (Pk). Remove all edges which are not in E∗(Pk). These edges will
stay removed in all subsequent steps.
2. If there is a lying agent i with x∗ij = 1 for his false item j, assign item j to him.
In the next instance, Pk+1, remove i and j. Proceed to (k + 1)-th iteration.
3. If there is a non-lying agent i such that all the items in Γ(i) are leaf items.
Then allocate Γ(i) to i. Remove i, Γ(i) and all the incident edges to get the
new instance Pk+1 and proceed to (k + 1)-th iteration step.
4. Pick a tight leaf agent i. Notice that i must have at least two items in Γ(i),
otherwise tightness would imply that the unique item is a leaf item and thus
either step 2 or step 3 must have been performed. Moreover, exactly one item
in Γ(i) is not a leaf item, and let j be this unique non-leaf item. Allocate all
the items in Γ(i) \ j to i. In Pk+1, remove Γ(i) \ j and all incident edges. Also,
modify the budget and bids of agent i. Note that agent i now bids only on item








Let the new budget of agent i be B′i := b
′
ij. Call i lying and j be his false item.
Proceed to (k + 1)-th iteration.
Claim 2.1.2 In each step, at least one item is allocated and thus MBA-Iter termi-
nates in m steps.
Proof: We show that one of the three steps 2,3 or 4 is always performed and thus
some item is always allocated. Consider any component. If a component has only
one agent i, then all the items in Γ(i) are leaf items. If Γ(i) has more than two items,
then the agent cannot be lying since the lying agent bids on only one item and Step 3
can be performed. If Γ(i) = {j}, then x∗ij = 1 since otherwise x∗ij could be increased
giving a better solution. Thus Step 2 or 3 can always be performed depending on if i
is lying or not. If the component has at least two agents, then it must have two leaf
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agents. This can be seen by rooting the tree at any item. At least one of them, say
i, is tight by Claim 2.1.1. Thus Step 4 can be performed. 2
Theorem 2.1.3 Given a problem instance P, the allocation obtained by algorithm
MBA-Iter attains value at least 3
4
· LP (P).
Proof: Let ∆k := LP (Pk)− LP (Pk+1) denote the drop in the optimum across the
k-th iteration. Denote the set of items allocated at step k as Qk. Note that the






j∈Qk value(j)). Also, the LP
optimum of the original solution is LP (P) =
∑
k ∆k since after the last item is
allocated the LP value becomes 0. The following lemma proves the theorem. 2






Proof: Items are assigned in either Step 2,3 or 4. Let us analyze Step 2 first. Let i
be the lying agent obtaining his false item j. Since x∗ij = 1 and lying agents bid on
only one item, the remaining solution (keeping the same x∗ on all remaining edges)
is a valid solution for the LP in Pk+1. Thus
LP (Pk)− LP (Pk+1) ≤ b′,
where b′ is the false bid of lying agent i on item j. Let b be the bid of agent i on item
j, before it was made lying. Then, from Step 4 we know that b′ := 4bx−B
3x
, where
x was the fraction of item j assigned to i and B is the budget of i. Moreover, the
portion of budget spent by i is at most (B − bx). This implies value(j) ≥ bx. The





In Step 3, in fact the LP drop equals the value obtained - both the LP drop and
the value obtained is the sum of bids on items in Γ(i) or Bi, whichever is less.
54bx2 − 4bx+B = b(2x− 1)2 + (B − b) ≥ 0
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Coming to step 4, Qk = Γ(i)\j be the set of goods assigned to the tight, non-lying
leaf agent i. Let b and b′ denote the bids of i on j before and after the step: bij and
b′ij. Let x be x
∗
ij. Note that x
∗
il ≤ 1 for all l ∈ Qk. Also, x∗ restricted to the remaining
goods still is a feasible solution in the modified instance Pk+1. Since the bid on item
j changes from b to b′, the drop in the optimum is at most
LP (Pk)− LP (Pk+1) ≤ (
∑
l∈Qk
bil) + (bx− b′x)
Note that value(Qk) =
∑




· value(Qk) which would prove the lemma.
If b′ = 0, this means 4bx ≤ B. Thus, value(Qk) ≥ B − bx ≥ 3bx. Otherwise, we
have
(bx− b′x) = bx− 4bx−B
3x
· x = B − bx
3
≤ value(Qk)/3
implying the claim, as before. 2
Remark: The above algorithm can be extended to the case of β-MBA as well. The






. It is not hard to modify Theorem 2.1.3 to show that this gives
a 1− β/4-factor algorithm for β-MBA.
2.2 Primal-dual algorithm for MBA
In this section we give a faster primal-dual algorithm for MBA although we lose a bit
on the factor. The main theorem of this section is the following:
Theorem 2.2.1 For any ε > 0, there exists an algorithm which runs in Õ(nm/ε)
time and gives a 3
4
· (1− ε)-factor approximation algorithm for MBA.
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pj : ∀i ∈ A, j ∈ Q; pj ≥ bij(1− αi); ∀i ∈ A, j ∈ Q; pj, αi ≥ 0}
(2)
We make the following interpretation of the dual variables: Every agent retains αi of
his budget, and all his bids are modified to bij(1− αi). The price pj of a good is the
highest modified bid on it. The dual program finds retention factors to minimize the
sum of budgets retained and prices of items. We start with a few definitions.
Definition 2 Let Γ : A→ 2Q be an allocation of items to agents and let the set Γ(i)
be called the items owned by i. Let Si :=
∑
j∈Γ(i) bij denote the total bids of i on items
in Γ(i). Note that the revenue generated by Γ from agent i is min(Si, Bi). Given αi’s,
the prices generated by Γ is defined as follows: pj = bij(1− αi), where j is owned by
i. Call an item wrongly allocated if pj < blj(1 − αl) for some agent l, call it rightly
allocated otherwise. An allocation Γ is called valid (w.r.t αi’s) if all items are rightly
allocated, that is, according to the interpretation of the dual given above, all items
go to agents with the highest modified bid (bij(1− αi)) on it. Note that if Γ is valid,
(pj,αi)’s form a valid dual solution. Given an ε > 0, Γ is ε-valid if pj/(1− ε) satisfies
the dual feasibility constraints with the αi’s.
Observe that given αi’s; and given an allocation Γ and thus the prices pj generated




Dual(i), where Dual(i) = Biαi +
∑
j∈Γ(i)
pj = Biαi + Si(1− αi) (3)
Now we are ready to describe the main idea of the primal-dual schema. The
algorithm starts with all αi’s set to 0 and an allocation valid w.r.t to these. We will
“pay-off” this dual by the value obtained from the allocation agent-by-agent. That
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is, we want to pay-off Dual(i) with min(Bi, Si) for all agents i. Call an agent paid
for if min(Bi, Si) ≥ 34Dual(i). We will be done if we find αi’s and an allocation valid
w.r.t these such that all agents are paid for.
Let us look at when an agent is paid for. From the definition of Dual(i), an
easy calculation shows that an agent is paid for iff Si ∈ [L(αi), U(αi)] · Bi, where
L(α) = 3α
1+3α
and U(α) = 4−3α
3−3α . Note that Si depends on Γ which was chosen to be
valid w.r.t. αi’s. Moreover, observe that increasing αi can only lead to the decrease
of Si and vice-versa. This suggests the following next step: for agents i which are
unpaid for, if Si > U(αi)Bi, increase αi and if Si < L(αi)Bi, decrease αi and modify
Γ to be the valid allocation w.r.t the αi’s.
However, it is hard to analyze the termination of an algorithm which both increases
and decreases αi’s. This is where we use the following observation about the function
L() and U(). (In fact 3/4 is the largest factor for which the corresponding L() and
U() have the following property; see Remark 2.2.4).
Property 2.2.2 For all α, U(α) ≥ L(α) + 1. 6
The above property shows that an agent with Si > U(αi)Bi on losing a single item j
will still have Si > U(αi)Bi− bij ≥ (U(αi)− 1)Bi ≥ L(αi)Bi, for any αi ∈ [0, 1]. Also
observe that in the beginning when αi’s are 0, Si ≥ L(αi)Bi. Thus if we can make
sure that the size of Γ(i) decreases by at most one, when the αi’s of an unpaid agent
i is increased, then the case Si < L(αi)Bi never occurs and therefore we will never
have to decrease α’s and termination will be guaranteed.
However, an increase in αi can lead to movement of more than one item from
the current allocation of agent i to the new valid allocation. Thus to ensure steady
progress is made throughout, we move to ε-valid allocations and get a 3
4
· (1 − ε)
algorithm. We now give details of the Algorithm 2.
6U(α)− 1 = 13−3α ≥
3α
1+3α =: L(α)⇐ 1 + 3α ≥ 9α(1− α)⇐ 9α
2 − 6α+ 1 ≥ 0
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Algorithm 2 MBA-PD: Primal Dual Algorithm for MBA
Define εi := ε · 1−αiαi . Throughout, pj will be the price generated by Γ and current
αi’s.
1. Initialize αi = 0 for all agents. Let Γ be the allocation assigning item j to agent
i which maximizes bij.
2. Repeat the following till all agents are paid for:
Pick an agent i who is not paid for (that is Si > U(αi)Bi), arbitrarily.
Repeat till i becomes paid for:
If i has no wrongly allocated items in Γ(i), then increase αi → αi(1+εi).
(Note that when αi = 0, εi is undefined. In that case, modify αi = ε from
0.)
Else pick any one wrongly allocated item j of agent i, and modify Γ
by allocating j to the agent l who maximizes blj(1 − αl). (Note that this
makes j rightly allocated but can potentially make agent l not paid for).
Claim 2.2.3 Throughout the algorithm, Si ≥ L(αi)Bi.
Proof: The claim is true to start with (L(0) = 0). Moreover, Si of an agent i decreases
only if i is not paid for, that is, Si > U(αi)Bi. Now, since items are transferred one
at a time and each item can contribute at most Bi to Si, the fact U(α) ≥ 1 + L(α)
for all α proves the claim. 2
Remark 2.2.4 In general, one can compare Dual(i) and min(Si, Bi) to figure out
what L,U should be to get a ρ-approximation. As it turns out, the largest ρ for which
U,L satisfies property 2.2.2 is 3/4 (and it cannot be any larger due to the integrality
gap example). However, the bottleneck above is the fact that each item can contribute
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at most Bi to Si. Note that in the case of β-MBA this is β · Bi and indeed this is
what gives a better factor algorithm. Details in Section 2.2.1.
Theorem 2.2.5 For any ε > 0, given αi’s, an allocation Γ ε-valid w.r.t it and pj,
the prices generated by Γ; if all agents are paid for then Γ is a 3/4(1 − ε)-factor
approximation for MBA.
Proof: Consider the dual solution (pj, αi). Since all agents are paid for, min(Bi, Si) ≥
3/4 · Dual(i). Thus the total value obtained from Γ is at least 3/4
∑
i∈ADual(i).
Moreover, since Γ is ε-valid, (pj/(1−ε), αi) forms a valid dual of cost 11−ε
∑
i∈ADual(i)
which is an upper bound on the optimum of the LP and thus the proof follows. 2
Along with Theorem 2.2.5, the following theorem about the running time proves
Theorem 2.2.1.
Theorem 2.2.6 Algorithm MBA-PD terminates in (nm · ln (3m)/ε) iterations with
an allocation Γ with all agents paid for. Moreover, the allocation is ε-valid w.r.t the
final αi’s.
Proof: Let us first show the allocation throughout remains ε-valid w.r.t. the αi’s.
Note that initially the allocation is valid. Subsequently, the price of an item j gener-
ated by Γ decreases only when the αi of an agent i owning j increases. This happens
only in Step 2, and moreover j must be rightly allocated before the increase. Now
the following calculation shows that after the increase of αi, pj decreases by a factor
of (1− ε). Thus, (pj/(1− ε), αi)’s form a valid dual solution implying Γ is ε-valid.
p
(new)
j = bij(1− α
(new)
i ) = bij(1− αi(1 + εi))
= bij(1− αi)(1− εiαi/(1− αi)) = p(old)j (1− ε)
Now in Step 2, note that until there are agents not paid for, either we decrease
the number of wrongly allocated items or we increase the αi for some agent i. That
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is, in at most m iterations of Step 2, αi of some agent becomes αi(1 + εi). Now, note
that if αi > 1 − 1/3m for some agent, he is paid for. This follows simply by noting
that Si ≤ mBi = U(1− 1/3m) ·Bi and the fact that Si ≥ L(αi)Bi, for all αi.
Claim 2.2.7 If αi is increased t > 0 times, then it becomes 1− (1− ε)t.
Proof: At t = 1, the claim is true as αi becomes ε. Suppose the claim is true for
some t ≥ 1. On the t+ 1th increase, αi goes to
αi(1 + εi) = αi + ε(1− αi) = αi(1− ε) + ε
= (1− (1− ε)t)(1− ε) + ε
= 1− (1− ε)t+1
2
Thus if αi is increased ln (3m)/ε times, i becomes paid for throughout the remainder
of the algorithm. Since there are n agents, and in each m-steps some agent’s αi
increases, in (nm · ln (3m)/ε) iterations all agents are paid for and the algorithm
terminates. 2
2.2.1 Extension to β-MBA
The algorithm for β-MBA is exactly the same as Algorithm 2. The only difference
is the definition of paid for and L(), U(). Call an agent paid for if min(Bi, Si) ≥
4−β
4
Dual(i). Define the function L(α) := α(4−β)
α(4−β)+β and U(α) :=
(1−α)(4−β)+β
(1−α)(4−β) Note
that when β = 1, the definitions coincide with the definitions in the previous section.
Claim 2.2.8 Given αi’s, agent is paid for if Si ∈ [L(αi), U(αi)] ·Bi




Si(1− αi)). Let us lose the subscript for the remainder of the proof.
The first implies
S(1− α) ≤ B( 4
(4− β)
− α)⇒ S(1− α) ≤ B (4− β)(1− α) + β
(4− β)






− (1− α)) ≥ Bα⇒ Sα(4− β) + β
(4− β)
≥ Bα⇒ S ≥ L(α)B
2
Property 2.2.9 For all α, U(α) ≥ L(α) + β
Proof: Note that U(α) = 1 + β
(1−α)(4−β) and L(α) = 1−
β
α(4−β)+β . Now,
U(α)− β ≥ L(α)⇐ β
(1− α)(4− β)
− β ≥ β
α(4− β) + β
⇐ 1
(1− α)(4− β)
≥ α(4− β)− (1− β)
α(4− β) + β
⇐ α(4− β) + β ≥ (4− β)2α(1− α)− (1− α)(1− β)(4− β)
⇐ α2(4− β)2 − α(4− β)((1− β) + (4− β)− 1) + β + (1− β)(4− β) ≥ 0
⇐ (α(4− β))2 − 2α(4− β)(2− β) + (2− β)2 ≥ 0
⇐ (α(4− β)− (2− β))2 ≥ 0
which is true for any α. 2
Theorem 2.2.10 The algorithm 2 with the above definitions gives a (1−β/4)(1−ε)-
factor approximation for β-MBA in Õ(nm/ε) time.
Proof: Armed with the Property 2.2.9 which implies Si ≥ L(α)Bi for all i, the
proof of Theorem 2.2.6 can be modified (the only difference is we need to run till
αi > 1 − 1/(4 − β)m instead of (1 − 1/3m)), to show that the algorithm terminates
with an ε-valid allocation with all agents paid for. The proof of the factor follows
from the proof of Theorem 2.2.5 and Claim 2.2.8. 2
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2.3 Inapproximability of MBA and related problems
In this section we study the inapproximability of MBA and the related problems as
stated in the introduction. The main theorem of this section is the following 15/16
hardness of approximation factor for MBA.
Theorem 2.3.1 For any ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate MBA to a factor
15/16 + ε. This holds even for uniform instances.
We give a reduction from Max-3-Lin(2) to MBA to prove the above theorem.
The Max-3-Lin(2) problem is as follows: Given a set of m equations in n variables
over GF (2), where each equation contains exactly 3 variables, find an assignment to
the variables to maximize the number of satisfied equations. H̊astad, in his seminal
work [29], gave the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.2 [29] Given an instance I of Max-3-Lin(2), for any δ, η > 0, its
NP hard to distinguish between the two cases: Yes: There is an assignment satisfying
(1− δ)-fraction of equations, and No: No assignment satisfies more than (1/2 + η)-
fraction of equations.
Let I be an instance of Max-3-Lin(2). Denote the variables as x1, · · · , xn. Also
let deg(xi) be the degree of variable xi i.e. the number of equations in which variable
xi occurs. Note that
∑
i deg(xi) = 3m. We construct an instance R(I) of MBA as
follows:
• For every variable xi, we have two agents which we label as 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉,
corresponding to the two assignments. The budget of both these agents is
4deg(xi) (4 per equation).
• There are two kinds of items. For every variable xi, we have a switch item si.
Both agents, 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉 , bid their budget 4deg(xi) on si. No one else
bids on si.
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• For every equation e : xi + xj + xk = α (α ∈ {0, 1}), we have 4 kinds of items
corresponding to the four assignments to xi, xj, xk which satisfy the equation:
〈xi : α, xj : α, xk : α〉, 〈xi : α, xj : ᾱ, xk : ᾱ〉, 〈xi : ᾱ, xj : ᾱ, xk : α〉 and
〈xi : ᾱ, xj : α, xk : ᾱ〉. For each equation, we have 3 copies of each of the four
items. The set of all 12 items are called equation items, and denoted by Se.
Thus we have 12m equation items, in all.
For every equation item of the form 〈xi : αi, xj : αj, xk : αk〉, only three agents
bid on it: the agents 〈xi : αi〉, 〈xj : αj〉 and 〈xk : αk〉. The bids are of value 1
each.
The following lemma is not hard to see.
Lemma 2.3.3 There always exists an optimal solution to R(I) in which every switch
item is allocated.
Proof: Suppose there is a solution which is not valid. Thus there is a switch item
si which is not allocated. Allocating si to either 〈xi : 0〉 or 〈xi : 1〉 and de-allocating
the items allocated to the agent can only increase the value of the allocation. 2
Since agents who get switch items exhaust their budget, any more equation items
given to them generate no extra revenue. We say that an equation item can be
allocated in R(I) only if it generates revenue, that is, it is not allocated to an agent
who has spent all his budget.
Lemma 2.3.4 Given an assignment of variables by R(I), if an equation e is satisfied
then all the 12 items of Se can be allocated in R(I). Otherwise, at most 9 items of Se
can be allocated in R(I).
Proof: If an equation e is satisfied, then there must be one equation item 〈xi : αi, xj :
αj, xk : αk〉 such that xr is assigned αr (r = i, j, k) in the assignment by R(I) (that is
the switch item sr is given to 〈xr : ᾱr〉). Assign the 12 items of Se as follows: give one
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the three copies of 〈xi : αi, xj : αj, xk : αk〉 to agents 〈xi : αi〉, 〈xj : αj〉 and 〈xk : αk〉.
Note that none of them have got the switch item. Moreover, for the other items in
Se, give all 3 copies of 〈xi : αi, xj : ᾱj, xk : ᾱk〉 to agent 〈xi : αi〉, and similarly for the
three copies of 〈xi : ᾱi, xj : αj, xk : ᾱk〉 and 〈xi : ᾱi, xj : ᾱj, xk : αk〉. Since each agent
gets 4 items, he does not exhaust his budget.
If an equation e is not satisfied, then observe that there must be an equation item
〈xi : αi, xj : αj, xk : αk〉 such that xr is assigned ᾱr (r = i, j, k) in the assignment.
That is, all the three agents bidding on this item have their budgets filled up via switch
items. Thus none of the copies of this equation item can be allocated, implying at
most 9 items can be allocated. 2
The following two lemma along with H̊astad’s theorem prove the hardness for
maximum budgeted allocation given in Theorem 2.3.1.
Lemma 2.3.5 If OPT (I) ≥ m(1−ε), then the maximum budgeted allocation revenue
of R(I) is at least 24m− 12mε.
Proof: Allocate the switch elements in R(I) so that the assignment of variables by
R(I) is same as the assignment of I. That is, if xi is assigned 1 in the solution to
I, allocate si to 〈xi : 0〉, and vice versa if xi is assigned 0. For every equation which
is satisfied, allocate the 12 equation items as described in Lemma(2.3.4). Since each
agent gets at most 4 items per equation, it gets at most 4deg(xi) revenue which is
under his budget. Thus the total budgeted allocation gives revenue: gain from switch
items + gain from equation items =
∑
i 4deg(xi) + 12m(1− ε) = 24m− 12mε. 2
Lemma 2.3.6 If OPT (I) ≤ m(1/2 + η), then the maximum budgeted allocation
revenue of R(I) is at most 22.5m+ 3mη
Proof: Suppose not. i.e . the maximum revenue of R(I) is strictly greater than
22.5m+ 3mη. Since the switch items can attain at most 12m revenue, 10.5m+ 3mη
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must have been obtained from equation items. We claim that there must be strictly
more than m(1/2 + η) equations so that at least 10 out of their 12 equation items are
allocated. Otherwise the revenue generated will be at most 12m(1/2 +η) + 9m(1/2−
η) = 10.5m+ 3mη The contradiction follows from Lemma(2.3.4). 2
2.3.1 Hardness of SMW with demand oracle
As noted in Section 2.0.3, MBA is a special case of SMW. Thus the hardness of
approximation in Theorem 2.3.1 would imply a hardness of approximation for SMW
with the demand oracle, if the demand oracle could be simulated in poly-time in the
hard instances of MBA. Lemma 2.3.8 below shows that this indeed is the case which
gives the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.7 For any ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate submodular welfare
with demand queries to a factor 15/16 + ε.
Lemma 2.3.8 Given any instance I of Max-3-Lin(2), in the corresponding in-
stance R(I) as defined in Section 2.3 the demand oracle can be simulated in polyno-
mial time.
Proof: We need to show that for any agent i and given prices p1, p2 · · · to the various





Call such a bundle the optimal bundle. Observe that in the instance R(I), the bid of
an agent i is 1 on an equation item and Bi on the switch item. Therefore, the optimal
bundle S either consists of just the switch item or consists of Bi equation items. The
best equation items are obviously those of the smallest price and thus can be found
easily (in particular in polynomial time). 2
2.3.2 Hardness of β-MBA
The hardness reduction given above can be easily modified to give a hardness result
for β-MBA, for any constant 1 ≥ β > 0. Note that the budget of an agent is four
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times the degree of the analogous variable. We increase the budget of agents 〈xi : 0〉
and 〈xi : 1〉 to 1β4deg(xi). For each agent, introduce dummy items so that the total
bid of an agent on these dummy items is ( 1
β
− 1) times its original budget. The rest
of the reduction remains the same. Call this new instance β-R(I).
Claim 2.3.9 We can assume that in any optimal allocation, all the dummy items
are assigned
Proof: If a dummy item is not assigned and assigning it exceeds the budget of
the agent implies the agent must be allocated an equation item. De-allocating the
equation item and allocating the dummy item gives an allocation of at least the
original cost. 2
Once the dummy items are assigned, the instance reduces to the original instance.
We have the following analogous lemmas of Lemma2.3.5 and Lemma2.3.6.
Lemma 2.3.10 If OPT (I) ≥ m(1 − ε), then the maximum budgeted allocation rev-
enue of β-R(I) is at least 24m−12mε+24m( 1
β
−1). If OPT (I) ≤ m(1/2+η), then the
maximum budgeted allocation revenue of R(I) is at most 22.5m+ 3mη + 24m( 1
β
− 1)
Proof: The extra 24m( 1
β
− 1) is just the total value of the dummy items which is
obtained in both cases. 2
The above theorem with H̊astad’s theorem gives the following hardness result for
β-MBA.
Theorem 2.3.11 For any ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate β-MBA to a factor
1− β/16 + ε.
2.3.3 Hardness of GAP
To remind, in the generalized assignment problem (GAP) we have n bins each with
a capacity Bi. There are a set of items with item j having a profit pij and size sij
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corresponding to bin i. The objective is to find an allocation of items to bins so that
no capacities are violated and the total profit obtained is maximized.
One of the bottlenecks for getting a better lower bound for MBA is the extra
contribution of switch items which are always allocated irrespective of I. A way of
decreasing the effect of these switch items is to decrease their value. In the case
of MBA this implies reducing the bids of agents on switch items. Note that this
might lead to an agent having a switch item and an equation item as he has budget
remaining, and thus the allocation does not correspond to an assignment for the
variables. This is where the generality of GAP helps us: the switch item will have a
reduced profit but the size will still be the capacity of the agent (bin). However, since
we would want switch items to be always allocated, we cannot reduce their profits by
too much. We use this idea to get the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.12 For any ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate GAP to a factor
10/11 + ε.
We now describe our gadget more in detail. The gadget is very much like the one
used for MBA.
• For every variable xi, we have two bins 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉, corresponding to the
two assignments. The capacity of both these bins is 2deg(xi) (2 per equation).
• There are two kinds of items. For every variable xi, we have a switch item si.
si can go to only one of the two bins, 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉. Its capacity for both
bins is 2deg(xi) while its profit is deg(xi)/2.
• For every equation of the form e : xi+xj+xk = α (α ∈ {0, 1}), we have a set Se of
4 items, called equation items, corresponding to the four assignments to xi, xj, xk
which satisfy the equation: 〈xi : α, xj : α, xk : α〉, 〈xi : α, xj : ᾱ, xk : ᾱ〉,
〈xi : ᾱ, xj : ᾱ, xk : α〉 and 〈xi : ᾱ, xj : α, xk : ᾱ〉. Thus we have 4m equation
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items, in all. Every equation item of the form 〈xi : αi, xj : αj, xk : αk〉, can go
to any one of the three bins 〈xi : αi〉, 〈xj : αj〉 and 〈xk : αk〉. The profit and
size for each of this bins is 1.
We will use R(I) to refer to the instance of GAP obtained from the instance I of
Max-3-Lin(2). Lets say a solution to an instance R(I) of GAP is a k-assignment
solution if exactly k switch items have been allocated. We will use valid-assignment
to refer to the n-assignment solution.
Lemma 2.3.13 For every solution of R(I) which is a k-assignment solution such that
variable xi is unassigned ( i.e. item si is neither allocated to 〈xi : 0〉 nor 〈xi : 1〉 ) there
exists a k-assignment solution of at least the same value in which xi is unassigned and
both 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉 together gets atmost one item from Se for every equation e
of xi. i.e. they both get a total of atmost deg(xi) items.
Proof: Suppose not. i.e. there exists an equation e (say xi + xj + xk = α) s.t. both
〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉 together gets atleast two items out of Se. Notice that the switch
items of xj and xk can fill the capacity of atmost one bin out of their respective
two bins. Suppose the free bins are 〈xj : α〉 and 〈xk : α〉 (The other cases can be
considered similarly). Now except for the item 〈xi : α, xj : ᾱ, xk : ᾱ〉, all the other 3
items in Se are wanted by 〈xj : α〉 and 〈xk : α〉. By the above property, all of these
3 items can be allcocated to the bins 〈xj : α〉 and 〈xk : α〉. Thus we can reallocate
the items of Se such that atmost one item out of Se is allocated to the corresponding
bins of variable xi without decreasing the profit. 2
Now by the above lemma, for any unassigned variable xi in a k-assignment solu-
tion, one of the bins out of 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉 will have atmost deg(xi)/2 items. We
can remove these items and allocate the switch element of xi without reducing the
profit. Thus we get the following corollary.
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Corollary 2.3.14 For every optimal solution of R(I) which is a k-assignment solu-
tion there exists a (k+1)-assignment solution which is also optimal. Therefore, there
exists a optimal solution of R(I) which is a valid assignment
Now using arguments similar to lemma 2.3.4 , one can show the following:
Lemma 2.3.15 Consider a valid-assignment solution (say v-sol) of R(I). If an equa-
tion e is satisfied by the assignment of variables given by v-sol then all the 4 items of
Se can be allocated in v-sol. Otherwise atmost 3 items out of Se can be allocated in
v-sol.
Now using arguments similar to lemma 2.3.5 and 2.3.6, one can prove the following
lemma which along with H̊astad’s theorem implies Theorem 2.3.12.
Lemma 2.3.16 Let I be an instance of Max-3-Lin(2) and R(I) be its reduction to
GAP, then:
• If OPT (I) ≥ m(1− ε), then the maximum profit of R(I) is at least 5.5m−4mε.
• If OPT (I) ≤ m(1/2 + η), then the maximum profit of R(I) is at most 5m+mη
Proof: Suppose OPT (I) ≥ m(1 − ε). Allocate switch elements in R(I) so that the
assignment of variables is same as the one given by optimal solution of I. Now the
profit from switch items equals:
∑
i(deg(xi)/2) = 3m/2. Also by lemma 2.3.15, the
profit from equation items is atleast 4m(1− ε). Combining both, we get the first part
of the lemma.
Suppose OPT (I) ≤ m(1/2 + η). By corollary 2.3.14, there exists a optimum
solution of R(I) which is a valid assignment. Consider any such solution. Now the
claim is that for no more than m(1/2 + η) equations, all the 4 items of Se’s can be
allocated in this solution. If they do, then along with lemma 2.3.15 it contradicts the
fact that OPT (I) ≤ m(1/2 + η). Thus profit from equation items can be atmost:
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4m(1/2 + η) + 3m(1/2− η) = 7m/2 +mη. Hence total profit can be atmost 3m/2 +
7m/2 +mη. 2
2.3.4 Hardness of weighted MSSF
Given an undirected graph G, the unweighted maximum spanning star forest problem
(MSSF) is to find a forest with as many edges such that each tree in the forest is a
star. The edge-weighted MSSF (eMSSF) is the natural generalization with weights
on edges. The node-weighted MSSF (nMSSF) has weights on vertices and the weight
of a star is the weight on the leaves. If the star is just an edge, then the weight of the
star is the maximum of the weights of the end points.
It is clear that the non-trivial part of the above problem is to identify the vertices
which are the centers of the stars. Once more, we reduce Max-3-Lin(2) to both
eMSSF and nMSSF. Let us discuss the edge-weighted MSSF first. For every variable
x in an instance of Max-3-Lin(2), we introduce two vertices: 〈x : 0〉, 〈x : 1〉. The
interpretation is clear: we will enforce that exactly one of these vertices will be the
center which will coincide with the assignment in the Max-3-Lin(2) instance. Such
an enforcing is brought about by putting a heavy cost edge between the vertices. For
every equation we will add vertices as we did in the reduction to GAP.
In the node-weighted MSSF, we need to add an extra vertex, the switch vertex,
along with the two vertices 〈x : 0〉, 〈x : 1〉. These vertices form a triangle and have a
weight high enough to ensure that exactly one of 〈x : 0〉, 〈x : 1〉 is chosen as a center
in any optimum solution to nMSSF.
We remark that Chen et.al [15] also use a similar gadget as the one above, al-
though their reduction is from a variation of MAX-3-SAT and thus their results are
weaker.
Hardness of eMSSF: Let I be an instance of Max-3-Lin(2). Denote the variables
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as x1, · · · , xn. Also let deg(xi) be the degree of variable xi i.e. the number of equations
in which variable xi occurs. Note that
∑
i deg(xi) = 3m. We construct an instance
E(I) of eMSSF as follows:
• For every variable xi, we have two variables which we label as 〈xi : 0〉 and
〈xi : 1〉, corresponding to the two assignments. These variables are called
variable vertices. There is an edge between them of weight deg(xi)/2.
• For every equation e : xi + xj + xk = α (α ∈ {0, 1}), we have 4 vertices
corresponding to the four assignments to xi, xj, xk which satisfy the equation:
〈xi : α, xj : α, xk : α〉, 〈xi : α, xj : ᾱ, xk : ᾱ〉, 〈xi : ᾱ, xj : ᾱ, xk : α〉 and
〈xi : ᾱ, xj : α, xk : ᾱ〉. This set of vertices are called equation vertices denoted
by Se. Thus we have 4m equation vertices in all. Each equation vertex of the
form 〈xi : αi, xj : αj, xk : αk〉 is connected to three variable vertices: 〈xi : αi〉,
〈xj : αj〉 and 〈xk : αk〉. The weight of all these edges is 1. Thus, the degree
of every equation vertex is 3 and the degree of every variable vertex 〈xi : 0〉 or
〈xi : 1〉 is 2deg(xi).
Lemma 2.3.17 Given any solution to E(I), there exists a solution of at least the
same weight where the centers are exactly one variable vertex per variable.
Proof: Firstly note that if none of the variable vertices are centers then one can make
one of them a center and connect the other to it and get a solution of higher cost
(note that the degrees of the variables in the equations can be assumed to be bigger
than 4 by replication). The proof is in two steps. Call a variable xi ∈ I unassigned if
both of 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉 is a center. Call a solution of E(I) k-satisfied if exactly
k of the variables are assigned. The claim is that there exists a solution of equal or
more weight which is n-satisfied. We do this via induction.
We show that if a solution to E(I) is k-satisfied with k < n,then we can get a
solution of at least this weight which is k + 1-satisfied. Pick a variable xi which is
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unassigned. For every equation e : xi + xj + xk = 0, say, containing xi we claim that
one can assume of the four equation vertices in Se, only one is connected to 〈xi : 0〉
and 〈xi : 1〉. This is because at least one of the two variable vertices corresponding
to both xj and xk are centers. Suppose these are 〈xj : 0〉 and 〈xk : 0〉. Now note
that of the four vertices in Se only 〈xi : 0, xj : 1, xk : 1〉 is not neighboring to either
of these centers. The three remaining can be moved to these without any decrease in
the weight of the solution and the claim follows.
Thus, we can assume that for every unassigned variable xi in the k-satisfied so-
lution, one of the two variable vertices 〈xi : 0〉 or 〈xi : 1〉 (say 〈xi : 0〉), is connected
to at most deg(xi)/2 equation vertices. Therefore, disconnecting all the equation
items connected to 〈xi : 0〉, making it a leaf and connecting it to 〈xi : 1〉, gives a
k + 1-satisfied solution of weight at least the original weight. 2
Now we get the hardness of eMSSF using the theorem of H̊astad.
Theorem 2.3.18 For any ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate edge-weighted MSSF
to a factor 10/11 + ε.
Proof: The proof follows from the following two calculations and Theorem 2.3.2.
• If OPT (I) ≥ m(1−δ), then the maximum profit of E(I) is at least 5.5m−4mδ.
For every variable xi, if the assignment of xi is α ∈ {0, 1}, make 〈xi : α〉 the
center. Observe that for every satisfied equation e : xi + xj + xk = α, all the
four vertices of Se can be connected to a center. Thus the weight of E(I) is at
least
∑
i deg(xi)/2 + 4m(1− δ) = 5.5m− 4mδ.
• If OPT (I) ≤ m(1/2 + η), then the maximum profit of E(I) is at most 5m+mη
From the claim above we can assume for each variable xi, one of its two variable
vertices is a center. This defines an assignment of truth values to the variables
and around half of the equations are not satisfied by this assignment. The
observation is that for any unsatisfied equation e : xi + xj + xk = α, one of
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the four equation vertices in Se is not connected to any center. Thus, the total
weight of any solution is at most
∑
i deg(xi)/2 + 4m(1/2 + η) + 3m(1/2− η) =
5m+mη.
2
Hardness of nMSSF: Let I be an instance of Max-3-Lin(2). The only difference
between the instance of nMSSF, N(I), and the eMSSF E(I) is that for every variable
xi ∈ I, along with the variable vertices 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉, we have a switch vertex si.
The three vertices from a triangle and the node-weights of all of them are deg(xi)/2.
The rest of the instance of N(I) is exactly like E(I) with the edge-weights being
replaced by node-weights of 1 on the equation vertices.
The reason we require the third switch vertex per variable is that otherwise we
cannot argue that in any solution to N(I) at least one of the variable vertices should
be a center. With the switch vertex, we can argue that this is the case. If none of
the variable vertices is a center, then the switch item is not connected to any vertex.
Thus making any one of the variable vertices as a center connected to the switch item
gives a solution to N(I) of weight at least the original weight.
Lemma 2.3.17 now holds as in the case of E(I) and thus similar to Theorem 2.3.19
we have the following hardness of node-weighted MSSF.
Theorem 2.3.19 For any ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate edge-weighted MSSF
to a factor 13/14 + ε.
Proof: The proof follows from the following two calculations and Theorem 2.3.2.
• If OPT (I) ≥ m(1− δ), then the maximum profit of N(I) is at least 7m− 4mδ.
For every variable xi, if the assignment of xi is α ∈ {0, 1}, make 〈xi : α〉
the center. Connect the switch item and the vertex 〈xi : ᾱ〉 to this center.
Observe that for every satisfied equation e : xi + xj + xk = α, all the four
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vertices of Se can be connected to a center. Thus the weight of N(I) is at least∑
i deg(xi) + 4m(1− δ) = 7m− 4mδ.
• If OPT (I) ≤ m(1/2+η), then the maximum profit of N(I) is at most 6.5m+mη
From the claim above we can assume for each variable xi, one of its two variable
vertices is a center. This defines an assignment of truth values to the variables
and around half of the equations are not satisfied by this assignment. The
observation is that for any unsatisfied equation e : xi + xj + xk = α, one of
the four equation vertices in Se is not connected to any center. Thus, the total
weight of any solution is at most
∑




In this paper we studied the maximum budgeted allocation problem and showed that
the true approximability lies between 3/4 and 15/16. Our algorithms were based on
a natural LP relaxation of the problem and we, in some sense, got the best out if
it: the integrality gap of the LP is 3/4. An approach to get better approximation
algorithms might be looking at stronger LP relaxations to the problem. One such
relaxation is the configurational LP relaxation which we describe in detail in section
2.4.1. Configurational LPs have been used for other allocation problems; in fact the
best known approximation algorithm of Feige and Vondrak [20] for SMW and GAP
proceeds by rounding the solution of the LP. We demonstrate an example which shows
that the integrality gap of this LP is at most 5/6. We leave the pinning down of the
integrality gap as an open question and we believe that the resolution might require
some newer techniques in addition to the ones developed in this paper.
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Another direction of research is improving the hardness of approximation factor. We
define a natural extention of SAT below which seems to be at the core of MBA and
other allocation problems like GAP and SWM.
Definition 3 Budgeted-3SAT(b): Given a formula φ = C1 ∧ C2 · · · ∧ Cm, where
each clause Ci is a disjunction of three literals, let the degree, deg(l), of a literal l be
the number of clauses the literal appears in. The Budgeted-3SAT(b) asks for an
assignment of variables and a maximum sized pairing {li, Ci} for every clause Ci and
li ∈ Ci such that the assignment of the literal satisfies the disjunction Ci, and every
literal l appears in at most b · deg(l) pairings.
Clearly, Max-3-SAT is just the Budgeted-3SAT(1) problem. Our hardness re-
sult essentially shows that Budgeted-3SAT(b) (for any budget b) can be reduced to
MBA, and a hardness of ρ(b) for Budgeted-3SAT(b) implies a hardness of 2ρ(b)+3b
2+3b
.
Implicit in our reduction is the fact that Budgeted-3SAT(2/3) is 7/8-hard which
gives us a 15/16 hardness for MBA.
For general values of b however the approximibility Budgeted-3SAT(b) is open.
In fact, for general b, it is not even clear if Budgeted-3SAT(b) is easier or harder
than Max-3-SAT. Obtaining hardness results for Budgeted-3SAT(b) seems to be
an interesting approach towards the inapproximibility of allocation problems.
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2.4.1 The configurational LP relaxation for MBA
In this relaxation, we have a variable xi,S for every agent i and every subset of items















∀i ∈ A, S ⊆ Q, xi,S ≥ 0}
The first constraint implies that each agent gets at most one subset of items. The
second implies that each item is at most one subset. The value generated on giving
a subset S to agent i is ui(S) = min(Bi,
∑
j∈S bij).
Solving the LP: Observe that the LP has exponentially (in n and m) many variables
and an obvious question is how to solve the LP. One does so by going to the dual LP
which will have exponentially many constraints but only polynomially many variables.













∀i ∈ A,∀j ∈ Q, αi, pj ≥ 0}
Suppose, for the time being, the LP(5) has a separation oracle: Given (αi, pj) one
can say in polynomial time if it is feasible for LP(5) or find a subset of agents S with
αi +
∑
j∈S pj < ui(S). If so, then the ellipsoid algorithm can be used to solve the LP
by making a polynomial number of queries to the separation oracle. Moreover, the
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subsets returned by the separation oracle are enough to describe the optimal solution
to the dual. In other words, in the primal LP(4), only the variables corresponding
to these constraints need be positive and the rest can be set to 0 and the optimum
is not changed. Since they are only polynomially many, LP(4) can now be solved in
polynomial time. Moreover, if one had an r-separation oracle (r ≤ 1): Given (αi, pj)
one can say in polynomial time if 1
r
· (αi, pj) is feasible for LP(5) or find a subset of
agents S with αi +
∑
j∈S pj < ui(S); then the above argument can be used to get an
r-approximation for the primal LP(4).
Note that the separation problem for LP(5) is precisely the demand oracle problem
described Section 2.0.3: given prices pj to items, for every agent i find a subset of
items maximizing (ui(S) −
∑
j∈S pj) where ui(S) = min(Bi,
∑
j∈S bij). The problem
is NP-hard with a reduction from Partition. Given an instance of partition of n
integers b1, b2, · · · , bn and a target integer B, consider the instance of the separation
problem with n items having bids b1 to bn and prices b1/2, · · · , bn/2 and budget B.
Note that the maximum value of the separation problem is at most B/2 and moreover
the optimum is B/2 if and only if there is a subset of the integers adding exactly to
B.
We now demonstrate an (1− ε)-separation oracle for LP(5) using the FPTAS for
the knapsack problem. The sketch below is not the fastest implementation as we
interested mainly in the existence of polynomial time algorithms. In the knapsack
problem, we are given a capacity of B and n items having profits pj and weight wj
and the goal is to obtain a subset of items having maximum profit with the total
weight being less than B. The problem in NP-hard, but an FPTAS exists. Moreover,
there is an exact algorithm which runs in time O(n2P ) where P is the largest profit.
Given the separation problem for LP(5), we consider the items in any arbitrary order.
The first item has a bid of b1 and price p1. Suppose the item is picked in the optimum
solution, call it S. If so, then
∑
j∈S bij ≤ B + b1, as otherwise one could discard the
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first item and get a better solution. Thus the optimum solution of the separation
problem given the first item is picked is precisely
max
0≤x≤b1
{Knapsack[{(b2 − p2, b2), · · · , (bn − pn, bn)}, B − x] + (x− p1)}
(x− p1) is the value of the item 1 after the items from b2, · · · , bn use up B − x of the
budget. One can repeat the procedure n times removing one item at a time and in
the end taking the best solution over all iterations. This gives the optimum solution
in time O(n3B2), where B is the budget.
To make the above algorithm run in polynomial time, we round down to the
nearest integer all the budgets, bids and prices by a factor of εB/n. The solution
to this reduced instance can be found in time O(n5/ε) and the same solution, scaled
back, can be shown to be within (1−ε) of the optimal solution (see for example, [63]).
Integrality gap of the configurational LP: In the next theorem we show that the
integrality gap of the configurational LP is between 3/4 and 5/6. The lower bound
follows basically by showing that the value of LP(4) is at most the value of LP(1)
(and thus is a better upper bound on the optimum). The upper bound follows from
an example which we demonstrate below.
Theorem 2.4.1 The integrality gap of the configurational LP of MBA is between 3/4
and 5/6.
Proof: An easy way to see that the configurational LP is stronger than LP(1) is
by looking at the duals of both LP’s. One can show that any solution (αi, pj) to
LP(2) corresponds to a feasible solution (Biαi, pj) to LP(5) of equal value. Thus the
configurational LP value is smaller than that of LP(1).
The 5/6-example is as follows: The instance consists of 4 agents a1, b1, a2, b2. a1, a2
have a budget of 1, b1, b2 have a budget of 2. There are five items: c, x1, y1 and
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x2, y2. Only b1 and b2 bid on c and bid 2. For i = 1, 2, ai and bi each bid on xi
and yi, and the bid is 1. Once again, if c is given to b1, then either a2 or b2 ends up
spending 1 less than his budget. Thus, the optimum MBA solution is 5. But there is
a solution to the configurational LP(4) of value 6. The sets are S1 = {x1}, S2 = {y1},
S3 = {x2}, S4 = {y2}, S5 = {c},S6 = {x1, y1} and S7 = {x2, y2}. The solution is:
xa1,S1 = xa1,S2 = xa2,S3 = xa2,S4 = 1/2 and xb1,S6 = xb1,S5 = xb2,S5 = xb2,S7 = 1/2. 2
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CHAPTER III
BUDGETED ALLOCATION: RANDOM ARRIVAL
MODEL
In this chapter we study online budgeted allocation problem in which there is a
random stream of item (queries) arriving online, and each item, as it arrives, has
to be allocated to one of several bidders who are bidding different amounts for it.
Each bidder also has a total budget limit. The goal is to maximize the total value
of the allocation. As the online setting is mostly motivated by the sponsored search
auctions, we will assume that the bid to budget ratio is small.
The algorithms used by the search companies currently are, in essence, Greedy :
Select the highest bidders for each query1. It can be shown that the Greedy algorithm
has a competitive ratio of 1/2 in the standard online worst-case competitive analysis
model. In [48] a deterministic algorithm with a competitive ratio of 1 − 1/e ' 0.63
was presented, which was proved to be optimal, even over randomized algorithms2.
In spite of the elegance and optimal competitive ratio of this algorithm, there
remains some dissatisfaction with the use of worst case analysis in that we are unlikely
to see a worst-case sequence of queries as input. In this paper we make a more
distributional assumption about the query sequence: the queries arrive in a random
permutation, i.e. the set of queries is still arbitrary, but the order of queries is random.
This leads us to formulate the following combinatorial problem :
1The bids are normalized by other factors, such as click-through-rate and relevance (see Google,
Yahoo!, MSN websites). Furthermore each winner is charged the next highest bid. For simplicity
of presentation, we will assume that the bids are already normalized, and furthermore, that we will
display only one ad per query, and hence need to determine a single winner per query. We do not
consider the issue of second price in our setting, and assume that a winning bidder pays his own bid.
2[48] made a natural modeling assumption that all the bids of a bidder are very small compared
to his budget. We will also make this assumption.
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There are m bidders. Bidder i has a budget of Bi. There is a (unknown)
set Q of n queries. For q ∈ Q, and i ∈ [m], bidiq is the bid of bidder i
for query q. The queries arrive online one at a time, in a random per-
mutation of Q. The algorithm has to allocate each query, as it arrives,
to a bidder. Let Qi be the set of queries allocated to bidder i at the
end of the input sequence. The revenue of the algorithm is defined as∑m
i=1 min{Bi,
∑
q∈Qi bidiq}. The goal of the algorithm is to maximize its
revenue.
We also study this allocation problem in the more standard i.i.d. input model, in
which there is an unknown distribution on queries, and the next query in the sequence
is picked independently from this distribution.
Understanding the budgeted allocation problem in distributional models is im-
portant, and was an open question in [48] and in [43] (see also the approach in [47]).
The random permutations model has been studied, e.g., in the classic secretary prob-
lems [19], recent work in auctions [4] and in data streams [28] with the motivation
that an adversary may have control over the set of inputs, but not have control over
the order of the input, which may follow some random process.
In the problem above, we will assume that for each bidder i ∈ m: maxq∈Q bidiq is
very small compared to Bi. This is a reasonable assumption for the sponsored search
auction model, and was also made in [48]. But in fact, our algorithm and analysis
work for a larger class, encompassing this assumption. We define this class formally
in Section 3.2, but mention here that this class also contains the problems of bipartite
matching (all bids 0 or 1, all budgets 1) and b-matching, for any positive integer b (all
bids 0 or 1, all budgets b). The offline version of this problem was studied in chapter
2 for the case when bids are not restricted to be small compared to budgets (when
the bids are very small compared to budgets then LP rounding gives a factor very
close to 1). Finally, we note that the problem defined above is a general combinatorial
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allocation problem, closely related to classic matching problems, and with possible
applications beyond the current motivation.
3.0.2 Main Results
Our main result is an analysis to show that Greedy has competitive ratio 1 − 1/e
in the random permutation input model, as well as in the i.i.d. model. This is to
be compared with the ratios in the worst case input model: 1/2 for Greedy and the
optimal 1− 1/e for the algorithm in [48]. We also show that our analysis is tight by
providing examples in the two models for which Greedy has ratio exactly 1 − 1/e.
We also show a lower bound that no deterministic algorithm can have a ratio better
than 3/4 and no randomized algorithm can have a ratio better than 5/6 for the case
of matching in the random permutation model.
Along the way, we provide a direct proof for the RANKING algorithm of [37] for
the online bipartite matching problem (see below for details).
3.0.3 Techniques:
From a technical perspective our work can be seen as simplifying and generalizing the
classic work of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani on online bipartite matching (matching
boys to girls) in the worst case input model [37]. Their RANKING algorithm fixes
beforehand a random permutation of the boys, and matches each arriving girl to
the highest available neighbor in the permutation. They show a duality result that
the performance of RANKING in the worst case is the same as the performance of
Greedy in the random permutations model (boys arrive in a random permutation).
They show that this competitive ratio is 1− 1/e, by analyzing a “virtual algorithm”
called EARLY, which is allowed to refuse to match a boy if the “correct” girl was
already matched off.
This proof, however, seems to have a hole, in particular, one of the lemmas (Lemma
6) is incorrect [42]. On the way to proving our main result on the general budgeted
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allocation problem, we provide a different proof for matching. This proof has the
advantage that it is simpler and direct, in that we do not consider any Refusal algo-
rithm (like EARLY) at all, but prove the factor of Greedy via direct arguments. This
simpler analysis enables us to extend the scope of the algorithm and the analysis to
our general assignment problem in the randomized input model3. We note that the
notion of Refusal (or EARLY) used in [37] does not even make sense in the general
budgeted allocation problem.
Our direct proof for the case of matching follows the main ideas from [37], but also
introduces some new ideas. To provide a direct proof for Greedy we use a different
classification of permutations: For each boy p, we classify the set of all permutations
into those in which p remains unmatched and those in which p gets matched. We
further classify the latter class into two subclasses – good and bad – depending on the
structure of the match. We then bound the number of unmatched boys by showing
that for every unmatched boy there is a certain fraction of bad matches, and for every
bad match there is a certain fraction of good matches. This gives us the factor of
Greedy.
The Tagging Procedure: In going from the case of matching to the more
general case of budgeted allocation, we need to develop some new techniques to take
care of the complexity introduced in having different bids for the same query. The
main reason is that in matching, since all the bids are 0 or 1 (with a budget of 1),
any match is as good as another, while this is not the case with different bids. This
creates several different (but related) issues: In matching, if a boy gets matched to
a wrong girl then it can affect at most one other boy, in the sense that at most one
other boy might not get matched. In the general problem, if a query goes to a wrong
bidder then it can affect several other queries in many different ways. To capture
3Our result, including the extension to the budgeted allocation problem, precedes the communi-
cation [42].
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this interaction we introduce a ‘tagging procedure’ which finds an appropriate map
from a query to other queries. This is required in order to define notions of good
and bad events. Another difference from matching is that a query may be tagged
simultaneously by any number of good and bad tags, while in matching the mapping
is always either good or bad, from exactly one boy to another.
On Monotonicity: In our analysis, an extremely important property that we
need is that of monotonicity of the allocation algorithm: If you move a query to the
front of the permutation, then each bidder spends at least as much money now as
before (see Lemmas 8 and 10 for details). This property seems very useful to get a
handle on the analysis: Our proof in the matching case exploits the fact that Greedy
is monotonic, while the proof in [37] has a hole precisely because EARLY is not
monotonic. However, upon moving to the general problem, it turns out that Greedy
is not monotonic as such. This creates an obstacle in the proof. We get around it by
analyzing a variant of Greedy: In the case that a bidder has not yet exhausted his
budget, but his bid for a query is larger than his remaining budget, we do not truncate
his bid, but instead over-spend his budget. Each bidder will overspend at most once,
and we will not count the overspending as part of the revenue. This variant of Greedy
can be shown to be monotonic, and therefore easier to analyze. We then show that
the revenue of Greedy is almost the same as that of the variant, thus proving a bound
for Greedy.
Regarding our random permutation model of input, we note that it is not new,
used most notably in the classic secretary-style problems [19] (see also [4]), in which
a random permutation of a set of numbers arrives online and we have to pick the
largest number when it arrives. Our problem is conceptually very different, since it
involves partitioning the entire random sequence into m parts to maximize the sum of
the values of the parts, rather than picking one element or structure in the sequence
which is the largest. Likewise, the techniques from secretary-style problems do not
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seem to apply here. The random permutations model has also been used recently in
the data-streams literature [28].
We first study the simpler case of bipartite matching in Section 3.1, before ana-
lyzing the general problem in Section 3.2. The reason is that the proof in the case
of matching may be easier to understand and may also help better understand the
general result. We analyze the i.i.d. model in Section 3.3.2, and provide the lower
bounds in the permutation model in Section 3.3.3. We conclude with a discussion in
Section 5.6.
3.1 The Case of Online Bipartite Matching
In this section we consider the special case of bipartite matching (bids all 0 or 1,
budgets all 1). In this problem, there is a bipartite graph (boys and girls). In the
random permutations model, only the girls are known to the algorithm in advance,
while the boys arrive in a random permutation. As a boy arrives, his incident edges
are revealed, and he can be matched off to some girl. The Greedy algorithm matches
each arriving boy to the first neighboring girl who is still available (first in some pre-
determined arbitrary order). We proceed to analyze the performance of Greedy in
this model. By duality [37], this also gives a proof for RANKING in the online worst
case model.
We label the boys and girls with numbers from 1 to n. We will use p, q ∈ [n] to
denote boys and girls, and use s, t ∈ [n] to denote the positions in the permutation.
We also use the notion of time: time t will denote the event when Greedy tries to
allocate boy at position t. We assume that there is an optimal matching of size n,
and that ∀ p ∈ [n] it matches boy p with the girl p. (This assumption is for simplicity
of presentation, and can be removed later). Let Ω be the set of all permutations of
[n]. For a permutation σ ∈ Ω, σ(s) will represent the boy at position s, and σ−1(p),
the position of boy p.
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3.1.1 Intuition:
Whether a boy p gets matched or not clearly depends on his position in the random
permutation. If he is high enough in the permutation, then he will get matched, but
if he comes in low in the permutation, then by the time he arrives, his desirable girls
may all have been matched off to other boys. We need to analyze the relationship
between the different permutations, and show that the fraction of permutations in
which the boy is unmatched (averaged over the boys) is not too large.
Let us say that boy p remained unmatched in a particular permutation σ. Note
that this could only have happened if girl p was already matched (say, to boy p′)
when boy p arrived. So we can associate the miss of boy p to the match of boy p′.
Likewise, we can associate every miss to a unique match. But notice that all these
matches that we considered are of special kind: girl p got matched to boy p′ and boy p
arrived after boy p′. We will later define these kind matches to be bad matches. Now
let us consider the second kind of match: i.e. girl p got matched to boy p′ and boy p
arrived before boy p′. We shall later define such a match of boy p′ to be a good match.
Note that in a good match we are guaranteed that both boy p and girl p got matched
(as well as boy p′). Our goal is to prove that, on the average over all permutations,
there are many matches, in particular, many good matches. Clearly, every miss for
boy p is caused by a bad match for some other boy q (who stole his girl p). This
immediately shows a factor of 1/2 for Greedy (in fact for every permutation). We
will show something stronger: On average over all permutations, the misses result in
a larger fraction of bad and good matches (averaged over the boys).
3.1.2 Proof Outline:












1 if girl q is matched to boy σ(s), and σ−1(boy q) > s,
0 otherwise.
Define also the following partitions for every boy p. Partition the set Ω into groups
of permutations s.t. in each group the relative order of all but boy p is fixed. Let Ωp
be one such group. Let σk ∈ Ωp be the permutation in which boy p occurs at position
k.
We will prove three main relationships between aggregates of these variables. The
first inequality follows immediately from the definitions (either the boy in position
t remains unmatched, or some girl gets matched to him). The other two require a
detailed look at the relationship between different permutations, and their proofs are
provided immediately below in Section 3.1.3. Lemmas 2 and 3 hold for every p ∈ [n]
and every group Ωp.
Lemma 1









missσ(t, p) = 1
Lemma 2























The three lemmas above constrain the variables miss, bad and good at the end
of Greedy, for every input. Note how Lemmas 2 and 3 show that if there are many
misses then there are many bad matches and therefore many good matches.

















We minimize the revenue over the constrained region given by the inequalities to get
the worst performance of the algorithm (on a random permutation of the worst set
Q). This program turns out to be linear, and we can solve the LP to show a factor
of 1− 1/e. This technique is known as a factor revealing LP.
Theorem 4 The competitive ratio of Greedy in the random permutations input model
(and hence of RANKING in the online model) is 1− 1/e.
Aggregating the inequalities. Now we will aggregate the constraints in Lemma


































Changing the order of summation and dividing by |Ω|, we get,
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Corollary 5



































(Corollary 5, Lemma 1)
good(t), bad(t),miss(t) ≥ 0
(6)
















mt, vt ≥ 0
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It can be shown that dropping the term mt+1 from the first set of equations does
not affect the LP solution by much. A proof of a similar statement is in KVV, and
so are the calculations. We provide an LP based calculation here, for completeness.






























αt, βt ≥ 0
Both LPs have the property that if we set all inequalities tight, we get a feasible
solution. This means that these solutions are optimal.
mt = αn+1−t = (1− 1/n)i−1, vt = βn+1−t = 1n(1− 1/n)
i−1
The optimal objective function sums up to n(1− 1/e) proving the theorem4.
2
3.1.3 Some Basic Properties of Greedy and Proofs of the Inequalities:
We start by describing three basic properties (Lemmas 7, 8 and 9) of the Greedy
algorithm and the variables defined above. These will help up work towards our main
lemmas (Lemmas 2 and 3). The first lemma follows easily from the definitions.
Lemma 7 [Prefix Property] For any two permutations σ1 and σ2, and any t ∈ [n],
if we have ∀ s ≤ t : σ−11 (s) = σ−12 (s), then the runs of Greedy on σ1 and σ2 are iden-
tical from time 1 to time t.
4We assumed that the optimal matching is perfect, i.e. OPT = n. The case of OPT < n can be
taken care of with minor changes in the proof.
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The second lemma describes a crucial monotonicity property of the Greedy algo-
rithm. Informally, it says that if you move a boy up front in the permutation, then
the set of girls who used to be matched by time t are now all matched by time t+ 1.
Formally, for s ∈ [n], define Gs(t) to be the set of the girls matched during the time
1 to t by Greedy in the run on permutation σs.
Lemma 8 [Monotonicity] ∀ s,m ∈ [n], s < m :
(1) ∀ t ∈ [1, s− 1] : Gm(t) = Gs(t)
(2) ∀ t ∈ [s− 1,m− 1] : Gm(t) ⊆ Gs(t+ 1)
Proof: The first part follows directly from Lemma 7. We will use induction on t to
prove the second part. The base case is when t = s − 1, and follows easily from the
first part itself. Suppose the lemma holds for all t ≤ k, where s− 1 ≤ k < m− 1. We
will show that the lemma holds for t = k + 1. By hypothesis, Gm(k) ⊆ Gs(k + 1).
Notice that the boy at position k + 1 in σm is same as boy at position k + 2 in σs.
Let us denote this boy by b.
If b is unmatched in the run of Greedy on σm, then the induction step holds
trivially. So, instead, assume that b is matched to girl g in the run of Greedy on σm.
We shall show that g ∈ Gs(k+ 2). Suppose not. This means that girl g was available
when Greedy was matching b in σs, but the boy b got matched to some other girl
g′ /∈ Gs(k + 1). By the induction hypothesis we have g′ /∈ Gm(k). Therefore both g
and g′ were available at time k+1 in the run on σm, and Greedy should have preferred
g′ over g in that run as well, a contradiction. Hence g ∈ Gs(k + 2) and the lemma
holds by induction. 2
From the definitions, we know that for any permutation σ, at most one out of the




(goodσ(t, p) + badσ(t, p)) ≤ 1 (7)
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The third property tells us which variable is 1, for each permutation σx ∈ Ωp:
Lemma 9 [Partition] Fix p, and a partition Ωp. Consider the run of Greedy on
the permutation σn. If girl p gets matched to the boy at position t, for some t ∈ [n],
then:
(1) ∀ x ∈ [1, t] :
∑
s:s≤t+1
goodσx(s, p) = 1
(2) ∀ x ∈ [t+ 1, n] : badσx(t, p) = 1
Proof: (2): By Lemma 7 (Prefix Property), we know that ∀ x ∈ [t+ 1, n], in the run
on σx, girl p is matched to the boy at position t, and therefore badσx(t, p) = 1.
(1): By Lemma 8 (Monotonicity), we know that ∀ x ∈ [1, t], in the run on σx, girl
p is matched to some boy whose position lies in the range [x, t + 1], and therefore∑
s∈[x,t+1] goodσx(s, p) = 1. 2
Now we are ready to prove the main inequalities (Lemmas 2 and 3):
Proof of Lemma 2 : If missσt(t, p) equals 0, then lemma holds trivially. So
assume that missσt(t, p) = 1. This means that in σt, boy p (who is in position t)
remains unmatched. This is possible only if girl p is matched to some boy whose
position is some t∗ < t. Now by Lemma 9, ∀ s ∈ [t∗ + 1, n], badσs(t∗, p) = 1. This



















Proof of Lemma 3 : We consider two different cases: whether girl p get matched
or remains unmatched in the run on σn.
Case 1: Girl p remains unmatched in σn. Take any permutation σx ∈ Ωp, x ∈ [n].
If girl p is matched in σx then, by Lemma 7 (Prefix Property), it could only be to a
boy in some position greater than or equal to x. Hence, ∀ t : badσx(t, p) = 0, and
the lemma holds trivially.
Case 2: Girl p is matched in σn. Suppose she is matched to the boy in position
t∗. There are two subcases:
Case 2.1: t < t∗. Lemma 9 and Lemma 7 tell us which of the variables are 1.
We see that for every σ ∈ Ωp, and every s < t∗, badσ(s, p) = 0. Hence in this case,
the left hand side is 0, and the lemma follows trivially.




























All the equalities follow from Lemma 9 and Equation (7). The first equality holds
because ∀ s 6= t∗, ∀ σ ∈ Ωp, badσ(s, p) = 0. The second equality holds because
badσ(t
∗, p) = 1 for precisely the last n − t∗ of the σ ∈ Ωp. Similarly, the last two
equalities hold because
∑
s:s≤t∗+1 goodσ(s, p) = 1 for precisely the first t
∗ of the σ in
Ωp, and the rest of the variables are 0. This proves the lemma in this case as well.
2
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3.2 The General Problem
In this section we study the general assignment problem as defined in section 1. As
mentioned there, our analysis holds for a larger class of inputs which includes bipartite
matching and the case of small bids. We describe this class here:
For each bidder i, consider an allocation of some subset of the queries to bidder





j=1 bidij. For every such allocation we are guaranteed that the overspending
is small compared to the budget, i.e.,
∑k
j=1 bidij −Bi  Bi.
We will show that Greedy, which assigns every query that arrives to the highest
bidder with a non zero remaining budget, has a competitive ratio of (1− 1/e) when
the input arrives in a random permutation of the (unknown) query set (the case of
i.i.d. inputs is considered in Section 3.3.2). Note that OPT is an offline optimum
algorithm and will have same allocation for any such input permutation.
Our analysis of Greedy in the matching case involved a mapping between a boy p
and the boy to whom girl p got matched. In the more general problem with different
bids, this kind of association becomes non trivial. For every query p there is a corre-
sponding bidder ip to whom OPT allocated query p. But now Greedy could assign
several queries with different bid values to this bidder and the mapping between query
p and these queries is not straightforward. Our tagging procedure takes care of this
difficulty:
For a permutation σ ∈ Ω, σ(s) will represent the query at position s, and σ−1(p),
the position of query p.
The Tagging Procedure: Fix an optimal allocation OPT and also fix, for each
bidder, an arbitrary ordering of the queries assigned to it in OPT . Now consider any
query q and the bidder i to whom OPT assigned q. In the fixed ordering, when OPT
assigned q to i, suppose that the money spent by i increased from x to y. Then we
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will call [x, y]i, the Opt-Interval of the query q: i.e., define Opt-Interval(q) = [x, y]i.
Greedy, run on some permutation σ, makes its own allocation, leading to a similar
Alg-Intervalσ(q) for each query q.
For a query q, the money in Opt-Interval(q) is spent by Greedy on some other
queries, say, e.g., q1, q2, q3. We say that q1, q2 and q3 tag the Opt-Interval of q. We
define tagsetσ(q1, q) as the set Opt-Interval(q) ∩ Alg-Intervalσ(q1). The same set is
also called goodsetσ(q1, q) or badsetσ(q1, q), depending on whether σ
−1(q) ≤ σ−1(q1)







Figure 1: How the money is spent in OPT and in the run of Greedy.
Example: For illustration purposes, consider the following scenario. Focus on
five special queries q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, and a bidder i who has a budget of 10. Fix an OPT
which assigns q4 and q5 to bidder i in that order (see figure 1). Consider a permutation
σ in which the relative positions of these queries is (q1, q2, q4, q5, q3), and suppose that
Greedy assigns q1, q2, q3 to bidder i (in that order). The bids of the different queries
are shown in the figure. Then we have the following tagsets: tagsetσ(q1, q4) = [0, 2]i,
tagsetσ(q2, q4) = [2, 5]i, tagsetσ(q1, q5) = ∅, tagsetσ(q2, q5) = [5, 6]i, tagsetσ(q3, q4) =
∅, tagsetσ(q3, q5) = [6, 8]i. The first four are badsets and the last two are goodsets
(since q3 is after q4 and q5 in the permutation). Note also that the subinterval [8, 10]i
of Opt-Interval(q5) is not tagged. This contributes towards the loss of Greedy, and
we will define it later as a miss of q5.
Note how a query’s Opt-Interval can be tagged simultaneously by any number
of other queries, and simultaneously with good and bad tags (unlike in the case of
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matching, in which the tags were one-to-one). Also, if a bidder spends more money in
Greedy compared to in OPT then some part of Alg-Intervalσ(q) may not even be used
to tag any Opt-Interval. Define extraσ(q) = Alg-Intervalσ(q) \ ∪p Opt-Interval(p).
Define |[x, y]i| = y−x. Also, for any query q, we define opt(q) = |Opt−Interval(q)|
and algσ(q) = |Alg − Intervalσ(q)|. By convention, |∅| = 0.
3.2.1 The Main Properties of Greedy and the Analysis
Recall from Section 3.1 that in the case of matching, Greedy has three properties
(namely Prefix, Monotonicity and Partition) which we exploited in proving the
relationships between the variables miss, bad and good. In the general case, as we saw
above, Greedy behaves in a much less controlled manner because of the different bids.
However, we manage to prove that the corresponding properties still hold, in spite of
this different behavior5. This is sufficient to prove our main lemmas (Lemmas 13, 14
and 17), and prove a factor of 1− 1/e.
We
Let us first explicitly spell out a very basic property of Greedy (which we took for
granted in matching):
Consistent Tie-Breaking: Consider a query q, and any two permutations σ, σ′.
Define highestσ(q) as the set of bidders who have the highest bid for q among all
bidders with non-zero remaining budget, when q arrives during the run on σ. Define
highestσ′(q) similarly. Suppose that highestσ′(q) ⊆ highestσ(q), and suppose that in
the run on σ, q is allocated to bidder i∗ ∈ highestσ′(q). Then it has to be true that
q is allocated to i∗, even in the run on σ′.
We now proceed to prove the monotonicity property.
Fix a query p ∈ Q. Partition the set of all permutations Ω into subsets such that
5As stated in the Introduction, Greedy as such is not monotonic, but we modify Greedy so that
it does not truncate the bid by the remaining budget. This variant is the one we analyze here, and
is monotonic.
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for each subset, all the permutations within the subset have the same order on all
queries, except for query p. For any subset Ωp of this partition, let the permutations
be called σ1, .., σn, according to the position of p.
Define algσ(i, t) to be the amount of money that bidder i has spent in the run
of Greedy on the permutation σ6 up to (just after) time t. We have the following
version of the monotonicity lemma:
Lemma 10 [Monotonicity] For every s, s′ ∈ [1, n], s′ < s, for every t ≤ s − 1,
and for every bidder i ∈ [1, n], we have one of the two conditions:
Either: algσs′ (i, t+ 1) ≥ algσs(i, t)
Or: algσs′ (i, t+ 1) ≥ Bi
Proof: Fix s′ < s ≤ n and a bidder i. We will prove the lemma by induction on t
going from 1 to s− 1. We are comparing the run of ALG on σs′ and on σs up to time
t. Note, firstly, that the two permutations are identical until position s′− 1, hence so
are the two runs (by the Prefix Property). So, in fact, ∀ t < s′, algσs′ (i, t) = algσs(i, t)
and so algσs′ (i, t + 1) ≥ algσs(i, t). Hence we may assume that the base case of the
induction is t = s′ − 1. Suppose the statement is true for some t ∈ [s′ − 1, s− 2]. We
will show it is true for t+ 1 as well. This would prove the lemma.
Let q be the query σs(t+1). Since t ∈ [s′−1, s−2], we know that σs′(t+2) = q as
well. Suppose that in the run on σs, ALG allocates q to bidder j. We ask: where does
ALG allocate q in the run on σs′? Define, for a permutation π and a time τ , availπ(τ)
as the set of bidders available with non-zero remaining budget in the run of ALG on
π at (just before) time τ . By the induction hypothesis, availσs′ (t+2) ⊆ availσs(t+1).
Also, we know that j ∈ availσs(t+ 1) and that j is the highest bidder among bidders
in availσs(t+ 1).
6Note that since the algorithm may overspend budgets, algσ(i, t) could be greater than Bi (how-
ever it is at most Bi + εi).
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Now consider two cases: If j ∈ availσs′ (t + 2) then, by the argument above, j
is the highest bidder in availσs′ (t + 2) as well, and (by the Consistent Tie-breaking
Property), ALG will allocate q to j in σs′ . In the second case, when j 6∈ availσs′ (t+2),
then algσs′ (j, t+ 1) ≥ Bj anyway. Hence, both actions keep the induction statement
true for t+ 1.
2
The prefix property holds as before, by the definition of Greedy:
Lemma 11 [Prefix Property] For any two permutations σ1 and σ2, and any
t ∈ [n], if we have ∀ s ≤ t : σ−11 (s) = σ−12 (s), then the runs of Greedy on σ1
and σ2 are identical from time 1 to time t.
For any position s, we will use tagsetσ(s, p) to mean tagsetσ(σ(s), p). Similarly
we define goodsetσ(s, p) and badsetσ(s, p). Also define extraσ(s) = extraσ(σ(s)). We
get the following version of the partition lemma:
Lemma 12 [Partition] Fix p, and a partition Ωp.
(1) ∀ x ∈ [1, t] : ∪s:x≤s≤t+1 goodsetσx(s, p) ⊇ tagsetσn(t,p)
(2) ∀ x ∈ [t+ 1, n] : badsetσx(t, p) = tagsetσn(t, p)
Proof: (2): Follows directly from Lemma 11.
(1): Suppose i∗ be the bidder to which OPT allocated query p. By the Prefix
Property, algσk(i
∗, k − 1) = algσn(i∗, k − 1) , and by the monotonicity lemma either
algσk(i
∗, s + 1) ≥ Bi∗ or algσk(i∗, s + 1) ≥ algσn(i∗, s). So either algσk(i∗, s + 1) −
algσk(i




′, p). But recall that tagsetσk(s
′, p) contributes
towards goodsetσk(s
′, p) for all s′ s.t. s′ ≥ k. This proves the lemma. 2
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Define goodσ(s, p) = |goodsetσ(s, p)| and badσ(s, p) = |badsetσ(s, p)|. Also define:
missσ(s, p) =

max(0, opt(p)− algσ(p)) if σ(s) = p
0 otherwise.
These three basic properties shown above (Lemmas 10, 11 and 12) suffice to
prove the required relationships between good, bad and miss, and to prove the main
theorem. We state these inequalities below (Lemmas 14 and 17 hold for every p ∈ Q
and every group Ωp).
Lemma 13





goodσ(s, p) + |extraσ(s)|+
∑
p
missσ(s, p) ≥ opt(σ(s))
Proof: For every σ, and every s ∈ [1, n],∑
p




= algσ(σ(s))− |extraσ(s)| (8)
The first equality is because of the fact that p is either above or below s in σ.
The second equality follows from the definition of extraσ(s). Now, by definition,
missσ(s, p) is possibly non-zero only for p = σ(s), in which case it is equal to
max{0, opt(p)− algσ(p)}. Hence,∑
p
missσ(s, p) = max{0, opt(σ(s))− algσ(σ(s))}
From (8), we get that∑
p










thus proving the lemma. 2
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Lemma 14







Proof: Define the quantity x :=
∑
s<t badσn(s, p). By the definition of badσn(s, p),
x ≤ opt(p). In fact, we shall show the following inequality:








We prove Equation (9) in a sequence of two claims:
Claim 15 missσt(t, p) ≤ x
Proof: Let i∗p be the bidder to whom OPT allocated the query p. We show the
following subclaim:
Subclaim: Consider the run on the permutation σt. At time t (when ALG
considers assigning query p), the remaining budget of i∗p is at least opt(p)− x ≥ 0.
Proof: First note that, by the Prefix Property,
∑
s<t badσt(s, p) =
∑
s<t badσn(s, p)
= x. Since in σt, ∀s < t, badσt(s, p) = |tagsetσt(σt(s), p)|, therefore
∑
s<t |tagsetσt(σt(s), p)|
= x. But this means that at least opt(p) − x length of Opt-Interval(p) is untagged
after time t−1 in the run on σt. Of course, this means that at least opt(p)−x amount
of budget of i∗p is still unspent at this time. This proves the subclaim.
If x < opt(p), then using the fact that the algorithm is greedy (and that we do
not truncate the bids of bidders by their remaining non-zero budgets), we see that














n−s . Note that, by the
definition of badσ(s, p) and by the Prefix Property:
badσk(s, p) =

badσn(s, p) for k ∈ [s+ 1, n]














This concludes the proof of Equation (9), and hence of the lemma.
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Lemma 17














Proof: To do a tight counting for the proof of the lemma, we need to define a notion
of weighted set. Given a universe U of elements, a weighted set Sw has weight on
all its elements. In particular, an unweighted set S can be viewed as a weighted
set with weight one on elements which are present in the set, and zero otherwise.
We shall also define two new operations ∗ and ⊕ on these weighted sets. Given a
weighted set S, and a number x, we define new weighted set S ′ = S ∗ x to mean
that weightS′(e) = weightS(e) ∗ x, ∀e ∈ U . Also given weighted sets S1 and S2, we
define S ′ = S1⊕S2 to mean that weightS′(e) = weightS1(e) +weightS2(e). S1 ⊆w S2
means that weightS1(e) ≤ weightS2(e), ∀e ∈ U . Define the measure of weighted
set S, µ(S) =
∫
U
weightS(u)du. For the rest of the proof, the term set will mean a
weighted set. We will consider sets on the universe Opt− Interval(p), which, recall,
is a interval of size opt(p), corresponding to a query p.
Fix an s ≤ t. Consider a subset Ωp s.t. badsetσn(s, p) 6= ∅. By the Prefix Property,
badsetσi(s, p) = badsetσn(s, p), ∀ i ∈ [s + 1, n]. By Partition lemma, Lemma 12, we
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see that for every k ≤ s, ∀l ∈ [s + 1, n]: badsetσl(s, p) ⊆
⋃s+1
s′=k· goodsetσk(s′, p), where
the union is a disjoint union.
Since the union is disjoint, this is the same as





By averaging, we see that:































































































































Theorem 18 The factor of Greedy in the random-permutation input model is at least
(1− 1/e).
Sketch of Proof: We shall use the same definition of miss(s), bad(s) and good(s)
as defined in the proof of theorem 4. Let extra(s) = Eσ∈Ω|extraσ(s)|. Using similar
approach as in the proof of theorem 4, we will get the following three corollaries from
Lemmas 13, 14 and 17.
Corollary 19
∀t : bad(t) + good(t) + extra(t) +miss(t) ≥ OPT/n
Corollary 20



















[bad(t) + good(t) + extra(t)]













good(t), bad(t), extra(t) ≥ 0






Now substituting mt for good(t)+bad(t)+extra(t), vt for bad(t)/n−t, and solving
it similar to online bipartite matching, we get that the value of objective function is
at least OPT (1− 1/e).
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Recall, however, that we had modified Greedy to allow overspending of budgets.
We can show (e.g., by induction) that the revenue of this variant of Greedy is almost
the same as that of the pure Greedy, which truncates the bids by the remaining bud-
get, when the bids are small (each bidder’s spending may be different by at most nε,
where epsilon is the largest bid). Thus we have proved the factor for both versions of
Greedy.
3.3 Additional Results
3.3.1 Tightness of the analysis
We prove that our analysis is tight, by giving an example in which Greedy does no
better that 1− 1/e :
Theorem 22 The factor of Greedy in the random-permutation input model is no
more than (1− 1/e).
In this instance, there are N bidders, each with a budget of L (a large integer).
The queries are grouped into N groups, Q1, Q2, ..., QN . Each group has L identical
queries. Each query in Qi gets the following bids: Bidders 1 through i − 1 bid 0;
bidders i through N bid 1. Clearly, OPT = LN , by allocating, for all i, all the
queries in Qi to bidder i.
We will assume that Greedy breaks ties in the following way: when an query
q arrives, it will be allocated to the highest numbered bidder who bids 1 and has
available budget. The assumption about bad tie-breaking can be removed by a simple
perturbation of the bids: for example, for all i, replace all the 1-bids of bidder i by
1 + εi, where 0 < ε1 < ε2 < · · · < εN  1. The budgets can be adjusted accordingly.
Now consider the performance of Greedy on the sequence of these queries arriving
in a random permutation σ. Clearly, the first L queries in σ will all be allocated
to bidder N (who bids for all queries). Among the next L queries in σ, all will be
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allocated to bidder N−1, except for any queries from QN , which are left unallocated.
Now among the third L queries in σ, some are allocated to N − 1, most to N − 2
and some are lost. Let us instead count in a different manner: It is clear that bidder
N , by symmetry, is allocated at most L/N queries from Qj, in expectation, ∀ j.
Similarly, bidder N − 1, by symmetry, is allocated at most L/(N − 1) queries from
Qj, in expectation, ∀ j ≤ N −1. In this manner one can see that bidder i is allocated
at most L/i queries from Qj, in expectation, ∀ j ≤ i.





N−j}. Summing this up, we can show that the expected amount of
money spent by Greedy is LN(1− 1/e) = (1− 1/e)OPT .
We note that this analysis is very similar to that in [48] for the lower bound in the
worst case online setting, the two being a form of duals of each other. The difference
is that the role of bidders and query groups is reversed – here it is the last N(1−1/e)
bidders who finish most of their budgets, while in [48] it was the first N(1 − 1/e)
query groups that get almost completely allocated.
3.3.2 The i.i.d. randomized input model
In this model there is a fixed (but unknown) distribution on Q, and the next query
in the sequence is picked independently from this distribution. A simple reduction to
our random permutation setting shows that:
Theorem 23 The factor of Greedy in the independent distribution input model is at
least (1 − 1/e). Also, there is an example distribution over which Greedy does no
better than 1− 1/e.
Proof:(Sketch) In this model we have a sample space consisting of the different
query sequences obtained by drawing n times from the given distribution. We have
to compare the expected performance of Greedy with the expected performance of
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OPT over this sample space7. Divide the sample space into classes s.t. the set of
queries is the same for every sequence in a class. Clearly, each class consists of all
the permutations of some set, and furthermore, the probability of occurrence of each
sequence in a class is the same. Suppose Ω′ is one such class. Then, by Theorem 18
we get that E[GREEDY |Ω′] ≥ (1 − 1/e)E[OPT |Ω′]. Taking expectation over the
different classes, we get the first part of the theorem.
For the second part of the theorem, we give a tight example – suppose there are
N bidders, and we are given a uniform distribution over N keywords, where the ith
keyword gets the following bids: Bidders 1 through i− 1 bid 0; bidders i through N
bid 1. We will use the tie breaking rules as discussed in the proof of theorem 22. We
will sample LN queries from the above distribution. Now by the Chernoff bound, we
can show that, for all δ, there is a large enough L so that w.h.p. each keyword is
sampled at most L + δ/N times. Now take the sample space in which each keyword
occurs at least L − δ/N times, and divide it into families s.t. in each family, every
sequence has a fixed set of queries. Using arguments similar to the ones in the proof
of theorem 22, we can show that expected performance of greedy, conditional over
any such family, is at most LN(1 − 1/e) + δ. Now taking expectation over all such
families we get that expected performance of greedy is at most LN(1− 1/e) + δ.
2
3.3.3 Lower Bound
The proof of the following theorem uses a uniform distribution on a set of simple 3×3
size bipartite matching examples.
Theorem 24 No deterministic algorithm can have a competitive ratio better than
3/4, and no randomized algorithm can have a competitive ratio better than 5/6, for
7The result also holds for the average of the ratios of Greedy and OPT, and not only for the ratio
of their averages.
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the case of bipartite matching in the random permutations model.
(Sketch of Proof) For the bound on deterministic algorithms, consider a very
simple 2 boy, 2 girl setting, where boy 1 could be matched to both the girls, but
boy 2 can only be matched to one of the two girls. By looking at the “code” of the
deterministic algorithm, we can decide which girl boy 2 can be matched to, so that
in one of the two random permutations of the boys, only one pair can be matched.
This shows a factor of 3/4.
For the lower bound on randomized algorithms, we will use Yao’s Lemma [66]
to prove this statement. We start with a distribution on inputs of the following
form: Take an n× n complete upper triangular matrix with 0, 1 entries. This is the
incident matrix of the bipartite graph, with the rows being the girls and columns
being boys. We use the uniform distribution over different inputs corresponding to
all permutations of the row names. As according to the model, each input has the
columns arrive in a random permutation. Thus the distribution is essentially uniform
distribution on both row and column permutations of the complete upper triangular
matrix.
As opposed to the proof in [37] for the worst case input model, it turns out to
be difficult to characterize the performance of any deterministic algorithm on this
input distribution. This is because a deterministic algorithm can (in this model) be
smart and use a lot of information from the past (as a very simple example, if it sees
a column with n − 1 1’s and then a column with n 1’s then it knows that the extra
row is the row with n 1’s). We have not been able to come up with a general analysis
for n, but we can do a brute force analysis for n = 3, in which we can take care of
how any deterministic algorithm may use all such information from the past. The
brute force analysis shows that the performance of any deterministic algorithm over
this input distribution is no more than 5/6, thus proving a lower bound of 5/6 for
randomized algorithms in the random permutations model.
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3.4 Further Discussion
Our motivation for studying Greedy was that this is what is actually used. However,
the question naturally arises: Is Greedy optimal in our distributional model? If we
make the assumption that there are n types of keywords, and many queries of each
type, and that we know the length of the query sequence, then there is an allocation
algorithm with a ratio very close to 1: Sample the sequence for an ε fraction of
its length and learn the distribution of queries. Now solve and round a revenue
maximization Linear Program to get 1 − ε ratio allocation. However, this sampling
method will not work if all the queries are distinct, and of course, this method could
be arbitrarily bad in the worst case. We do not know of any algorithm provably better
than Greedy in the random permutation model, but we believe that the algorithm
from [48] performs strictly better. Currently we can show that it cannot do better
than a factor α ∼ 0.81.
Recall that in the case of matching, it was proved in [37] that RANKING in the
worst case and Greedy in the random permutations case are duals of each other.
The question naturally arises for the general assignment problem: What is the dual
algorithm to Greedy? It turns out that no such duality result seems to hold in the
general case. Furthermore any such dual would have the bidders arriving in online,
and hence would not apply to online assignment. We note that a attempt was made
in [48] towards this, but that proof was incorrect and was withdrawn.
Finally, it is important to investigate the extent to which the RANKING algorithm
of [37] and its ideas can be generalized, maybe even to offline algorithms.
74
CHAPTER IV
BUDGETED AUCTIONS: DECREASING VALUATION
BIDS
In this chapter, we study a new bidding model for the sponsored search auctions
(budgeted auction with small bid/budget ratio) – decreasing valuation bids. This
provides a richer language than the current model for advertisers to convey their
preferences. Furthermore, we show that the competitive ratio of online algorithms
that have been studied in the standard setting is retained.
Bidding language is one of the most important design parameters in auction de-
sign. This is the interface provided to the bidders by the seller, which allows them
to express their preferences to the seller. There is always a trade-off in this choice.
The more complex a bidding language is, the better can it capture bidder preferences,
and indirectly, the better it is for the seller. But at the same time, it is essential to
have a simple bidding language, so that the bidders will be able to translate their
innate preferences into the language in the first place. Simplicity of expression is
not the only reason preventing us from choosing highly complex bidding languages.
A second reason is computational: Even if the bidders express their preferences in a
complex bidding language, it may be impossible for the seller to process such complex
preferences and decide on an optimal (or even a good) outcome efficiently. Such a
trade-off becomes apparent in the design of complex auctions, and has been studied
in detail in the literature, for example, in the case of combinatorial auctions [51].
The bidding language currently provided by the search engines is essentially of the
following form: A bidder i can bid, for each keyword q he is interested in, a monetary
bid biq, expressing the value he gets if his ad is displayed with search results for queries
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of type q. Together with the bids, the bidder is also allowed to report a daily global
budget Bi, which means that over all the keywords, he is not willing to spend more
than Bi.
While this bidding model does capture the essential features of advertiser prefer-
ences, namely, the individual bids and a global budget, it fails to express more complex
constraints that the advertisers may have. For example, the advertiser may not want
to be in a situation in which he wins many ad slots, but all of them for queries of
the same single keyword. He would prefer to have diversity, in the sense of winning
a reasonable amount of ad slots for several different keywords of his choice. There
are two reasons to expect real advertisers to have such preferences: firstly, advertisers
may wish to make their presence felt in several different sub-markets at the same
time, and sell different products at comparable rates. Secondly, there are situations
in which advertisers have decreasing marginal utility from subsequent advertisements,
e.g., once the ad reaches a certain fraction of the target audience.
It is important to find expressive, yet simple and practically implementable bid-
ding languages which would provide bidders with more control to express such pref-
erences. Note that it is not even possible to simulate such preferences in the current
bidding model, say by splitting into several different accounts. We stress the follow-
ing four properties of our model: Firstly, our bidding model is an add-on to the
current model, and hence can be gradually introduced on top of the current model.
Bidders may choose to continue bidding as they did in the current model if they
prefer. Secondly, as our results show, there may be no need to change the alloca-
tion algorithms used by the search engine, even upon introducing the new bidding
model. Thirdly, the better expressivity will, in our opinion, allow the bidders to bid
with more control and less risk, and therefore more aggressively, indirectly improve
the revenue of the search engine. Finally, we believe that this model may lead to
less fluctuations in the bids, as opposed to the current model in which bidders may
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dynamically change their bids as they win certain number of queries.
4.1 A new bidding language: Decreasing valuation bids
In the decreasing valuations bid model, bidder i bids the following:
• A global daily budget Bi.
• For each keyword w he is interested in, a decreasing function fi,w : Z+ → R,
which is to be interpreted as follows: If bidder i has already been allocated x
number of queries of keyword w, then his bid for the next query of keyword w
is fiw(x).
Note that the current model only allows constant functions fiw(x) = biw,∀x. A simple
and practical special case of our model is one which allows only functions of the form
fiw(x) =

biw if x ≤ tiw
0 otherwise
This special case means that bidder i values each of the first tiw queries of keyword
w at biw each, but does not want more than tiw of w’s . We shall call this special case
the case of q-budgets.
Remark: The notion of spending constraints was introduced in [17] in the context
of bidder utilities in markets and the computation of market equilibrium prices. There
the utility of a bidder for the next item of a type of good depended on how much
money he had already spent on that type. Here our definition is in terms of how
many items of that type have been allocated to the bidder. But note that in our case
the price of each item is static, determined by the bid curve, so our bid curve can be
simply translated to a curve in the axis of money spent instead.
4.2 Results in the new models
Better expressivity is clearly better for the bidder (as long as the language remains
simple enough to understand). So with the introduction of this new models of bidding
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languages, the question which arises naturally is: How does this affect the search
engine’s profits?
Intuitively, it is clear that the bidders will now be able to bid with more control
and therefore face less risk, and will bid more aggressively. This is clearly better for
the search engine, in terms of the optimal profit (OPT) derivable from the bidders.
But what if the bidding language introduces computationally difficult problems for
the search engine? Then it will not be able to efficiently extract a good portion of
the OPT as profit. We show that our models do not introduce such computational
difficulties, by describing optimal allocation algorithms in both these settings, whose
competitive ratio (in an online competitive analysis model) is 1−1/e, as good as that
of the optimal algorithm [48] in the standard model.
We also show that our bidding language is at the correct trade-off point between
expressivity, simplicity and computational efficiency. Simple generalizations of our
bidding model (by adding more expressivity) result in computational problems for
which no algorithms can perform better than a factor of 1/2, and for which the
natural Greedy algorithm has an arbitrarily bad factor.
4.2.1 Our Techniques
The algorithm we analyze in the new model is precisely the algorithm from [48] for
the standard bidding model. For each arriving query, this algorithm (which we will
call MSVV in the sequel) determines the effective bid of each bidder as his bid for
the query scaled by a function ψ of the fraction of budget that the bidder has spent
so far (the function is ψ(x) = 1− e−(1−x)). Then the algorithm awards the query to
the bidder with maximum effective bid. It is shown in [48] that this algorithm has a
competitive ratio of 1− 1/e in the standard bidding model, and that this is optimal
(even over randomized algorithms). We show that the same algorithm has the same
factor even in our generalized bidding models. Clearly it is optimal since our models
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are more general than the standard model.
Our proof technique follows the proofs in [48]. In that proof, the main idea was
to show that for each query q, the algorithm gets some effective amount of money
(which is the real money scaled by some factor depending on ψ) which is comparable
to an effective amount that OPT gains for q. This kind of query-by-query analysis
is not possible here, since the bid of a bidder i for a query q itself depends on how
many other queries of that type have already been allocated to him. Thus the bid
depends on the context in which q arrives with respect to the previous choices of the
algorithm. We take care of this by a careful charging argument: we demonstrate the
existence of a map between the queries that OPT assigns and the queries that ALG
assigns (not necessarily to the same bidder). This helps us show sufficient profit for
ALG. The analysis in [48] can be thought of as the special case when this map is the
identity map.
4.2.2 Intuition
At first thought it seems very surprising that this algorithm would perform well in
the presence of extra constraints. After all it seems to be ignoring the information
provided by, say, the q-budgets for different q, while OPT may be using this informa-
tion to its benefit. The reason why the algorithm works is that these particular extra
constraints that we add turn out to be fortuitously geared to help the algorithm. The
following example illustrates this in the context of the Greedy algorithm (recall that
this has factor 1/2 in the standard model):
Consider the example shown in [36, 48] on which the greedy has a competitive
ratio of 1/2 (for the standard bidding model). There are two bidders b1 and b2. Bidder
b1 is interested in keywords w1 and w2, whereas bidder b2 is only interested in keyword
w2. Both have a budget of N , and a bid of 1. Now consider the sequence in which N
queries of keyword w2 come first and then N queries of keyword w1 come next. OPT
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will allocate all the w2’s to bidder b2 and all the w1’s to bidder b1, thus earning 2N
units of money. Whereas greedy could assign all the w2’s to bidder b1, and after that
when the w1’s come in bidder b1 cannot buy them, as he has exhausted his budget.
So all the w1’s will go wasted, thus greedy will earn only N units of money, or about
half of OPT .
The reason why greedy is factor 1/2 is that we allocate too many w2’s to bidder
b1. Now consider the following two cases in the q-budget version.
Case 1: b1 has a w2 − budget constraint. Now, clearly there is a limit to which
greedy could go bad as it cannot allocate too many w2’s to bidder b1. So adding a
w2 − budget to the standard model cannot make greedy worse.
Case 2: b1 has a w1 − budget constraint. This case seems more dangerous,
because greedy could do badly by allocating too many w2’s to b1. But this is not the
case, since greedy’s allocation becomes bad only when OPT allocates too many w1’s
to b1. But a w1 − budget would not allow OPT to gain too much in this case.
Thus in one case, the q-budget prevents Greedy from taking a bad step, and in
the other case it makes sure that what Greedy missed was not useful anyway. In fact
we will show in section 4.3 that greedy still retains the factor 1/2 in these models.
The above ideas, though applied to Greedy, also hold for MSVV.
4.3 The Decreasing Valuations Bidding Language
4.3.1 A Warm-up: Analysis of Greedy
Recall that Greedy was factor 1/2 in the standard model. Does the factor change
in the model with decreasing bids? We answer in the negative – Greedy retains its
factor of 1/2.
Theorem 25 The competitive ratio of Greedy algorithm in the decreasing valuation
bid model is 1/2.
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Proof: Let Si be the set of queries assigned by OPT to bidder i. We will use
greedy(Q), OPT (Q) to denote the money earned by the queries Q in Greedy and
OPT respectively. We will use greedy(i), OPT (i) to denote the money spent by
bidder i in greedy and OPT respectively. We will show that
∀ i : greedy(i) + greedy(Si) ≥ OPT (i)
Summing over all i, we get:∑
i
(greedy(i) + greedy(Si)) ≥ OPT
Now any query q can be counted atmost twice in the summation:
∑
i(greedy(i) +
greedy(Si)). Hence, 2 ∗ greedy ≥ OPT , as required.
Now it remains to prove the equation above. If greedy(i) ≥ OPT (i), then we’re
done. So assume that greedy(i) < OPT (i). This means that greedy(i) < Bi, so
bidder i has remaining budget even at the end of Greedy. Now since the greedy
allocates to the highest bidder, therefore all the queries of Si which are not assigned
by greedy to bidder i (call the set of such queries S ′i ⊆ Si) must be making at least
what bidder i is offering. Let Swi be the restriction of S
′
i to keyword w. We only
need to consider keywords w′ s.t. the number of w′ queries allocated by greedy to
bidder i is less than that allocated by OPT to i. Since the bidding function is non-
increasing, therefore all the queries in Sw
′
i are offered more money from bidder i in
greedy than what OPT made by allocating Sw
′
i to i. Therefore collectively these
queries must be making a profit of atleast (OPT (i, w′)− greedy(i, w′)) in the greedy,
where OPT (i, w′), greedy(i, w′) is the money spent by bidder i on keyword w′ in
OPT and greedy respectively. Summing over all keywords w, we get greedy(S ′i) ≥
(OPT (i)− greedy(i)).
Therefore, greedy(Si) ≥ (OPT (i)−greedy(i)). Hence, ∀i, greedy(i)+greedy(Si) ≥
OPT (i). Note how we have crucially used the fact that the bid curves are decreasing.
2
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4.3.2 Analysis of MSVV
In this section we will analyze the performance of the MSVV algorithm in the decreas-
ing bids model. Let us recall the algorithm in the standard model. For clarification,
we will use w to name a keyword, and q to name a query – a query q can be of type w.
The Algorithm. For the next query q (of type w) compute the effective bid of bidder
i as: biwψ(y) where y is the fraction of budget spent by i, and ψ(y) = 1 − e−(1−y).
Award q to the bidder with the highest effective bid.
In the decreasing bids model, the effective bid becomes:
fiw(x)ψ(fraction of budget spent by i)
where x is the number of queries of keyword w already allocated to i.
We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 26 MSVV achieves a factor of 1− 1/e.
We will follow the proof structure as in [48]. The crucial difference in the proof
is in a careful charging via a well-chosen map between queries. We start with some
preliminary notation.
Start by picking a large integer parameter k. Define the type of a bidder according
to the fraction of budget spent by that bidder at the end of the algorithm BALANCE:
say that the bidder is of type j if the fraction of his budget spent at the end of the
algorithm lies in the range ((j−1)/k, j/k]. Slab i is the portion of money [(i−1)/k, i/k]
of all the bidders.
Also, let αj denote the number of bidders of type j. Let βi denote the total money
spent by the bidders from slab i in the run of the algorithm. It is easy to see that
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β1 = N/k, and
∀ 2 ≤ i ≤ k, βi = N/k − (α1 + . . .+ αi−1)/k (10)
Let ALG(q) (OPT (q)) denote the revenue earned by the algorithm (OPT) for
query q. Say that a query q is of type i if OPT assigns it to a bidder of type i, and
say that q lies in slab i if the algorithm pays for it from slab i.
This concludes the notation from [48]. Fix a keyword w, and let Qw be the set of
all queries of keyword w, and let QOPTw be the set of queries of keyword w assigned by
OPT to all the bidders of type strictly less than k (these are the bidders who haven’t
spent all their money). We will drop the subscript w when it is clear by context. We
will use subscript i to denote the restriction of any variable to bidder i.
Let qij denote the j
th query of keyword w allocated to the bidder i. Since fi,w
is a decreasing function, therefore fi,w(qij) ≤ fi,w(qi(j−1)). Let qOij , qAij denote the
allocation by OPT and ALG respectively. The inequality above holds for both these
allocations.
Lemma 27 For each keyword w, there exists a injective map σ : QOPTw → Qw s.t.
∀q ∈ QOPTw ,
OPT (q)ψ(type(q)) ≤ ALG(σ(q))ψ(slab(σ(q)))
Proof: To prove the lemma, we will construct the mapping for every query in QOPTw
such that the lemma holds (we will drop the w subscript henceforth).We do this in
two phases.
Phase 1: For each bidder i, define
xi = min(|QOPTi |, |QALGi |). We define a mapping for the first xi queries in the OPT
allocation:
∀ t ∈ [1, xi] : Define σ(qOit ) := qAit
Therefore,
ALG(σ(qOit )) = ALG(q
A




Since, by definition, type(qOit ) ≥ slab(qAit), therefore,
ψ(type(qOit )) ≤ ψ(slab(qAit))
OPT (qOit )ψ(type(q
O
it )) ≤ ALG(σ(qOit ))ψ(slab(σ(qOit )))
Hence for the queries q mapped in first phase, we get:
OPT (q)ψ(type(q)) ≤ ALG(σ(q))ψ(slab(σ(q)))
Phase 2: Lets call the queries from QOPT which were mapped in phase 1 to be
Q1OPT . Define Q2OPT = QOPT − Q1OPT . Similarly call the queries of Q to which
queries from QOPT got mapped in the phase 1 to be Q1. Define Q2 = Q−Q1. Now
look at a query q ∈ Q2OPT s.t. OPT (q)ψ(type(q)) is maximum over all the queries
in Q2OPT . Now look at any query q′ ∈ Q2. We shall show that OPT (q)ψ(type(q)) ≤
ALG(q′)ψ(slab(q′)). Lets say OPT assigned query q to the bidder iq. Since in the
first phase we mapped min(|QOPTiq |, |Q
ALG
iq |) queries, and q ∈ Q
OPT
iq was not mapped,
hence xiq must be equal to |QALGi |. Now, since the bidding function is decreasing,
therefore wlg we can assume that q =: qOiq(xiq+1). When ALG was allocating q
′, then
the bid of bidder iq was OPT (q). Hence by the allocation policy of the algorithm,
OPT (q)ψ(type(q)) ≤ OPT (q)ψ(slab(q)) ≤ ALG(q′)ψ(slab(q′)).
Therefore, in particular,
∀q ∈ Q2OPT , OPT (q)ψ(type(q)) ≤ ALG(σ(q))ψ(slab(σ(q)))
Hence the lemma holds.
2
Let αwi be the money obtained by OPT from bidders of type i with keyword w only.
Similarly let βwi be the portion of money obtained by ALG in slab i from keyword w





i − βwi ) ≤ 0
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Proof: Let Qw be the set of queries of keyword w. From lemma 27, we get:∑
q∈Qw:type(q)≤k−1
[OPT (q)ψ(type(q))













Now notice that in the MSVV algorithm, whenever a bidder hits kth slab, algo-

































i=1 ψ(i)(αi − βi) ≤ 0
Now, the calculations follow as in [48]: Using Corollary 29, Equation 10 and the
definition of the trade-off function ψ, we get that the loss of the algorithm is at most
OPT/e, hence proving the theorem.
4.4 Discussions
4.4.1 Towards more Expressive Models
We show that providing even slightly more (non-trivial) expressiveness leads to com-
putational issues. Consider the case of Group Budgets: Instead of restricting to local
budget constraints on a single keyword, the bidders are allowed to set a local budget
on a group of keywords.
Suppose that the set of keywords is {w0, w1, .., wk}. Let cw represent the number
of queries of keyword w. Consider the following instance: There is a single bidder
and his bid on all the keywords is one dollar. His budget is, lets say, t ∗ k, and has
following k constraints on group of keywords:
∀i ∈ [1, k], cw0 + cwi ≤ t
Now consider the two sequence of queries (w0 t times) and (w0 t times,
w1 t times, · · · , wk t times). Its easy to see that: No randomized algorithm can do
better than 1/2 on both the sequences. Also Greedy has a factor 1/k on the second
sequence. Thus the extension to group budgets loses the computational possibilities
available in our decreasing bids model. We believe that our bidding model achieves
the correct trade-off between simplicity, expressivity and computational complexity.
4.4.2 Beyond the factor 1− 1/e
We now show how tightening Corollary 29 helps in getting bounds better than 1-1/e.
Later we will try to see the conditions which tighten the Corollary 29.
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Suppose we had that
∑k−1
i=1 ψ(i)(αi − βi) ≤ −x. This (−x) goes directly to the
objective function of the dual LP considered in the analysis of MSVV (see[48] for
details). Since the objective function of the dual represents the maximum loss of
the algorithm as compared to OPT, hence the total loss becomes OPT
e
− x, and the





What are the cases when the x value is substantial? We believe that one case
is when the bid curves decrease rapidly. The intuition is that if for a bidder i and
keyword w, the bad case that the algorithm allocates less queries of type w to i than
OPT does, is actually a good case. This is so because OPT derives much lesser profit
for the extra queries (since they are farther in the bid-curve), while ALG allocates
these elsewhere, more profitably. Characterizing this gain over 1 − 1/e in terms of




In this chapter, we introduce and study combinatorial problems with multi-agent
submodular cost functions. We look at some well known covering problems in this
setting and establish matching lower and upper bounds for the approximability of
these problems.
A multitude of fundamental computational problems with real-world applications
can be cast in the following framework: We are given a set X of elements, a collection
C of subsets of X (i.e. C ⊆ 2X) and a cost function f over the subsets of X. The
collection C is typically specified via a combinatorial structure like a matroid or a
graph property (for instance, the set of all spanning trees in a graph). The objective
is to select a set S ∈ C that minimizes f(S).
Motivated by the considerations mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, we
define the following class of combinatorial problems with multi-agent submodular cost
functions (MSCP) problems - We are given a set of elements X and a collection
C ⊆ 2X . We are also given k agents, where each agent i specifies a normalized
monotone submodular cost function fi : 2
X → R+. The goal is to find a set S ∈ C
and a partition S1, ..., Sk of S such that
∑
i fi(Si) is minimized.
There has been some work along these lines [10, 22, 61, 64, 27], but to the best
of our knowledge, none of them has studied multi-agent submodular functions over
a truly combinatorial structure. For instance, the work of [10] studies submodular
function maximization over matroid constraints only in the single agent setting, the
work of [61, 64] considers the Multi-Agent submodular functions setting but the
combinatorial structure (or the collection C) used in their problem is either the set
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of all subsets or the whole set itself.
Submodular functions form a rich class and capture the natural properties of
economies of scale or the law of diminishing returns . A function f : 2X → R+ is said
to be submodular iff for any two sets S and T ⊆ X, f(S)+f(T ) ≥ f(S∪T )+f(S∩T ).
Function f is said to be monotone if f(S) ≤ f(T ) for any S ⊆ T , and normalized if
f(∅) = 0. Note that linear functions, i.e. functions of the form f(S) =
∑
i∈S ai, are a
special and classically studied subcase of submodular functions, Since a submodular
function is defined over an exponentially large domain, we will work with the value
oracle model in which an oracle will return the value of f(S), when queried with the
set S ⊆ X.
By fixing the collection C to any particular combinatorial structure, one can define
a subclass of the problems of interest. In this contribution, we study the following
fundamental subclass of problems in MSCP :
• Combinatorial Reverse Auction (CRA): We are given a set X of elements
and the collection C consists of only the set X, i.e. in the required solution all
the elements must be covered. This models the situation where a set of jobs
needs to be assigned to multiple workers.
• Submodular Vertex Cover (MS-VC): We are given an undirected graph
G(V,E). Element set X is the same as the set of vertices V and the collection
C consists of all the vertex covers of the graph. Recall that a set S ⊆ V is a
vertex cover if every e ∈ E is incident on a vertex in S.
• Submodular Minimum Perfect Matchings (MS-MPM): In this setting,
we have a undirected graph G = (V,E) with cost functions over E. G contains
at least one perfect matching. Element set X is the set of all edges, and the
collection C is defined as the set of all perfect matchings of G. Recall that a
set M ⊆ E is a perfect matching of G if exactly one edge in M is incident on
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every vertex.
• Submodular Minimum Spanning Tree (MS-MST): We are given a con-
nected undirected graph G = (V,E) with cost functions over E. Element set
X is the set of all edges, and the collection C is the set of spanning trees of G.
Recall that a spanning tree is a minimal connected subgraph of G.
For each of the above problems, we study both the single agent and the multi-agent
setting.
5.0.3 Motivation and Applications
In this contribution, we propose to extend the algorithmic study of covering type
problems to the more general setting of submodularity and multiple agents. From
a practical viewpoint, each of the problem we study is meaningful in its own right.
Combinatorial reverse auctions are used by buyers to obtain required goods or services
from various sellers, for instance the procurement of components required to build
high-end goods like automobiles or computers. Spanning trees are used in network
design problems, and it is reasonable to assume that different agents could have
different submodular cost functions depending on the set of edges they can construct
cheaply. Similarly one can motivate rest of the problems as they are used in many
settings, especially those related to algorithmic game theory.
From a theoretical perspective, one would like to extend the tools and techniques
developed for combinatorial problems with linear cost functions to as general a setting
as possible. Submodular functions are a natural generalization where one would
expect to be able to extend the techniques. Despite the significant recent progress on
some of the fundamental problems in this area [10, 22, 61, 64, 27], the algorithmic
theory for combinatorial problems with submodular cost functions is not substantially
developed yet. Many more basic questions remain to be identified and solved, which
could form the basis of tools and techniques for solving more complex problems.
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5.0.4 Our Results
We give an approximation algorithm and a matching information theoretic lower
bound for each of the subclass of problems that we mentioned earlier. We present
these results in the table below.
Table 2: Results
Single-agent Multi-agent
Lower bound Upper bound L. bound U. bound
Reverse Auction 1 1 Ω(log n) O(log n) [30]
Vertex Cover 2− ε 2 Ω(log n) O(log n)
Perfect Matching Ω(n) O(n) Ω(n) O(n)
Spanning Tree Ω(n) O(n) Ω(n) O(n)
Note that the minimum perfect matching and minimum spanning tree problems,
which are polynomial time solvable with linear cost functions, become very hard with
submodular cost functions.
We would like to draw attention to our hardness result for the Vertex Cover
problem in the single agent case. In the classical vertex cover problem, the best
known approximation factor is 2, and the best known hardness of approximation is
1.3606 (assuming P 6= NP ) [18]. Khot et al. [41] showed that achieving a factor of
2− ε ‘might be’ hard by showing hardness result based on UGC conjecture [39]. Our
results for Vertex Cover in the single agent case implies that, if the cost function over
the set of vertices is submodular, then the optimal approximation factor is indeed 2.
Our hardness results use information theoretic arguments and follow the frame-
work explained in Section 5.1, along with special manipulations specific to each prob-
lem. Our algorithms are based on LP rounding or greedy methods.
We would like to point out that our results for perfect matchings and spanning
trees extend to the class of subadditive cost functions, and to related combinatorial
structures such as steiner trees.
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5.0.5 Related Work
Submodular functions have been of great interest in Optimization in the past. The
most fundamental of them is, perhaps, the non-monotone submodular function min-
imization problem. A sequence of works in this direction [55, 33, 31, 53, 32, 34]
has resulted in fast strongly polynomial time combinatorial algorithms. Another re-
lated work is that of non-monotone submodular function maximization [22]. Both
these algorithms are sometimes used as a subroutine in solving the configuration LPs
corresponding to some other submodular combinatorial optimization problem.
Another body of work in optimization over submodular functions deals with wel-
fare maximization [10, 64, 20, 40]. Calinescu et al. [10] studied submodular function
maximization subject to matroid constraints. They showed that their problem con-
tains as a subcase many other allocation problems, thus giving a unified framework
for studying such problems. Matching information theoretic lower bounds were es-
tablished in [49].
Very recently, Svitkina and Fleischer [61] studied submodular objective function





upper and lower bounds for all these problems, showing that all these problems be-
come much more hard in the submodular setting. Goemans et al. [27] gave an
algorithm for constructing explicit approximate submodular functions by querying
polynomial number of times to the original submodular function. Some other related
work in optimization that uses submodular functions include [56, 30, 62, 60, 65]. For
the Combinatorial Reverse Auction problem, [30] noted that the generalization of
greedy algorithm for Set Cover problem gives a log(n) approximation ratio. For the
lower bound of the Combinatorial Reverse Auction, it turns out that we only redis-
covered the factor, as we later found out that Nisan [52] has already proved similar
result, though using a slightly different technique.
Recall that the problems we study in this contribution are very well studied in
92
the linear cost setting. Min cost perfect matching and spanning tree can be solved
exactly in polynomial time. Algorithm for vertex cover with factor 2 for weighted
graphs was first given by [5]. The best known hardness of approximation for Vertex
Cover is 1.3606 (assuming P 6= NP ) [18]. Using UGC conjecture [39], Khot and Regev
[41] showed that achieving a factor of 2 − ε is hard. Combinatorial reverse auction
generalizes the set cover problem. A simple greedy algorithm gives a factor log n for
the set cover, and Feige [21] showed that this factor is essentially the best possible
by showing a matching hardness of approximation result, under the assumption that
NP complete problems does not exhibit quasi-polynomial time algorithms.
5.1 Preliminaries: Information Theoretic Lower Bounds
In this contribution we establish the complexity of some multi-agent submodular
combinatorial optimization problems. A problem is said to have information theoretic
lower bound of α if any randomized algorithm that approximates the optimum to a
factor α with high probability requires superpolynomial number of queries to the
value oracle.
By Yao’s principle, it suffices to establish the lower bounds for deterministic al-
gorithms acting on an input which is picked randomly from some fixed distribution.
To show these approximation gaps, we follow the general framework which was also
used in [61, 27, 22]. We will outline this framework in the single agent setting.
The idea is first to choose a problem instance which has a suitably large collection
set C ⊆ 2X of interest. For example, for the spanning tree problem, we choose a
graph that has exponentially many spanning trees. Then we design two submodular
cost functions f and g. Typically, g is deterministically picked, whereas f is chosen
from a distribution. The choice of f and g relies on the following two properties: a)
f and g must be ‘hard to distinguish’ in the sense that they return the same value
on almost all queries and b) The optimum values of f and g over C must differ by
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a large factor. Intuitively this amounts to ‘hiding’ a particular set Q ∈ C in f by
setting f(Q) to a low value. The set Q is chosen from a distribution over C. Since
C is designed to be extremely large, this leaves an exponentially small probability of
an arbitrary query S made by an algorithm differentiating f from g. By the union
bound and a computation path argument [61, 22], an algorithm making polynomially
many number of queries cannot distinguish between f and g. Combining this with
the gap in the optima of f and g, one proves the lower bound.
We note an important observation from the above discussion, which we will use
in our proofs of lower bounds:
Observation 5.1.1 To prove an information theoretic lower bound using two sub-
modular functions f and g with a gap in their optimum values, it suffices to prove
that Pr[ f(Q) 6= g(Q) ] is exponentially small over the random choice of Q ⊆ X.
The above framework can be extended to the multi-agent setting by choosing two
sets of submodular functions.
5.2 Combinatorial Reverse Auction
In this problem we are given a set J , of n elements and m agents. For each agent i
we have a normalized monotone submodular cost function fi : 2
J → R+. We wish
to partition the elements among the agents to minimize the total cost. We prove
a Ω(log n) information theoretic lower bound on the hardness of approximation and
provide an algorithm that matches this bound. We also prove the same algorithm to
be m-approximate.
5.2.1 Proof of hardness
In this section, we derive an Ω(log n) lower bound on the hardness of approximation
for the CRA problem. The idea is to construct a deterministic instance and a ran-
dom instance of the CRA problem so that the optimal solution of these two instances
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differ by a factor of Ω(log n), and then show that with high probability, a determin-
istic algorithm which uses only polynomially many value queries can not distinguish
between these two instances.
Consider the following deterministic instance of CRA: There are m agents and
a set J of n = m(m + 1)2/4 elements. The elements are equally partitioned into
m blocks J1, J2, ..., Jm. We will choose m such that m = 2
d − 1, for some d. Now




1≤k≤m, ai·ak=1 Jk. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, agent i is only interested in elements
in Gi. It can be shown that |{ak : ai · ak = 1}| = (m + 1)/2. Thus each agent is
interested in only (m+1)/2 blocks of elements and for each block there are (m+1)/2
agents who are interested in it. Now, we define the cost function fi : 2
J −→ R+ as
follows:
fi(S) =
 min{|S|, (m+ 1)
2/4}, if S ⊆ Gi
∞, otherwise
Let us analyze the optimal cost of this instance. We say that an agent is marked
if the total size of elements assigned to his is at least (m + 1)2/4. Among all the
optimal solutions, let OPT be the one that maximizes the number of marked agents.
We claim that at least d agents are marked in OPT. Suppose not, then without loss
of generality, we may assume M = {1, 2, ..., t} to be the set of marked agents and
t < d. The system of linear equations ai · x = 0,∀1 ≤ i ≤ t has at least one solution
x∗ ∈ GF [2]d, since number of equations is less than the number of variables. Let k
be the number between 1 and m corresponding to the vector x∗. This implies that
no agent in M is interested in block Jk. Let Ak = {i1, i2, ..., iw} be the set of agents
who are assigned some elements in Jk. Then Ak ∩M = ∅. Therefore, we can mark
one more agent by transferring the elements in Jk from agents i2, i2, ..., iw to agent i1
without changing the cost of the new solution. This is a contradiction because of the
choice of OPT . Hence, the optimal cost of this instance is at least (m+ 1)2d/4.
95
For the random instance, we have the same sets of agents and elements. Also,
each agent is interested in the same set of elements. However, the cost function for
each agent is defined by a probability distribution on the set assigned to her. Next
we describe our construction of the random cost functions explicitly.
For each element, assign it uniformly at random to one of the agents who is inter-
ested in it. Let Si be the set of elements which agent i gets. Clearly (S1, S2, ..., Sm)
forms a partition of the element set J . We define the cost function gi : 2
J −→ R+,
for agent i as follows:
gi(S) =
 min{ |S ∩ Si|+ min{|S ∩ Si|, (1 + δ)(m+ 1)/2 }, (m+ 1)
2/4}, if S ⊆ Gi
∞, otherwise
where δ > 0 is a fixed constant.
Now we show that with high probability, a deterministic algorithm using only poly-
nomially many value queries can not distinguish between f = (f1, f2, ..., fm) and g =
(g1, g2, ..., gm). We prove the following lemma.
Lemma 30 For any subset S of elements and any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Pr[fi(S) 6= gi(S)] =
e−Ω(m).
Proof:
Suppose S is a subset of elements and 1 ≤ i ≤ m. By our construction, gi(S) ≤ fi(S).
Therefore Pr[fi(S) 6= gi(S)] = Pr[gi(S) < fi(S)].
First of all, we claim that the above probability is maximized when S ⊆ Gi and |S| =
(m+ 1)2/4. For this, if S 6⊆ Gi, then fi(S) = gi(S) =∞ hence Pr[fi(S) < gi(S)] = 0. Now
suppose S ⊆ Gi and |S| ≥ (m+ 1)2/4. Then fi(S) = (m+ 1)2/4. Therefore,
Pr[gi(S) < fi(S)] = Pr[|S ∩ Si|+ min{|S ∩ Si|, (1 + δ)(m+ 1)/2 } < (m+ 1)2/4]
This probability can only increase when we remove elements from S. For the case when
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|S| ≤ (m+ 1)2/4, we get
Pr[gi(S) < fi(S)] = Pr[|S ∩ Si|+ min{|S ∩ Si|, (1 + δ)(m+ 1)/2 } < |S|]
= Pr[min{|S ∩ Si|, (1 + δ)(m+ 1)/2 } < |S ∩ Si|]
= Pr[|S ∩ Si| > (1 + δ)(m+ 1)/2]
Thus, this probability can only increase when more elements are added to S. Hence under
the condition S ⊆ Gi,|S| ≤ (m + 1)2/4, the probability is also maximized when |S| =
(m+ 1)2/4.
Now we assume S ⊆ Gi and |S| = (m + 1)2/4. In this case, Pr[gi(S) < fi(S)] =
Pr[|S ∩ Si| > (1 + δ)(m + 1)/2], which by a standard Chernoff bound arguments, can be
shown to be bounded by e−Ω(m). 2
If we define f(S) = (f1(S), ..., fm(S)) and g(S) = (g1(S), ..., gm(S)), then by a simple
union bound, as a corollary of the lemma, we have Pr[f(S) 6= g(S)] = poly(m)e−Ω(m).
Now suppose A is a deterministic algorithm which makes polynomially many queries to the
value oracle. Then by the union bound, with probability at most poly(m) · e−Ω(m), A can
distinguish between f and g. Notice that for the cost function g = (g1, ..., gm), the optimal
solution is at most (1 + δ)m(m + 1)/2 achieved by assigning Si to agent i. However, as
we showed, the optimal solution for the cost function f = (f1, f2, ..., fm) has cost at least
d(m + 1)2/4, thus with high probability, A can not approximate a CRA instance within
factor (m+1)
2d/4
(1+δ)m(m+1)/2 ' d = c log n for some c < 1.
At last, by Yao’s principle, we have the following:
Theorem 31 A randomized approximation algorithm for the CRA problem within factor
c log n for some c < 1 needs to make exponentially many value queries.
5.2.2 A min(m, log n) approximation algorithm for combinatorial reverse
auction
A log n approximate algorithm for this problem appeared in [30]. In what follows we provide












xi,S ≥ 1 ∀u ∈ X






yu ≤ fi(S) ∀S ⊆ V, ∀i
yu ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ X
In LP1, xi,S is used to represent the fraction of set S that is allocated to agent i. Since
fi(S) −
∑
u∈S yu is a submodular function, we can construct a separation oracle for the
dual program using the submodular minimization algorithm as a subroutine. Thus we can
solve LP1 and LP2 optimally. The following lemma describes the structure of an optimal
solution to LP1.
Lemma 32 There exists an optimal fractional solution to LP1 such that for every agent i
the set Ti = { S : xi,S > 0 } forms a nested family.
Proof:
Let x be any feasible solution to LP1. If Ti is not nested, then there exist A,B ∈ Ti
such that neither A nor B is contained in the other. We may assume xi,A ≥ xi,B. We will
construct another feasible solution x′ to LP1 as follows:
• x′i,A∪B = xi,B
• x′i,B = 0
• x′i,S = xi,S for all S ∈ X other than the
above.
• x′i,A = xi,A − xi,B
• x′i,A∩B = xi,B if A ∩B 6= ∅
• x′j,S = xj,S ∀j 6= i and ∀S ∈ X
By submodularity, one can verify that the cost of the solution x′ is at most the cost
of x. If the set T ′i corresponding to x′ is nested, we are done. Otherwise, we repeat the
procedure for x′. The termination of the above procedure can be guaranteed by observing
that the potential function
∑
S∈Ti
|S|2 strictly increases and is polynomially bounded. 2
Let x be an optimal solution of LP1 with cost W , satisfying the conditions in lemma 32
and Ti be the corresponding nested families of sets. Let T =
⋃
i Ti. Let Y denote the set of
uncovered elements in X. In each iteration pick the set (i, S) ∈ T minimizing fi(S)/|S∩Y |.
Add S to the cover and assign it to agent i. Remove all the newly covered elements from
Y . Repeat until all elements are covered. Since each Ti is a nested family, an agent can
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drop all but the largest set assigned to her. Let (i, S) be the set covering an element u in
the integral cover. Then we define α(u) = fi(S)/|S ∩ Y | to be the cost ‘borne’ by u. Note
that
∑
u α(u) is exactly the cost of the integral cover.
Let u ∈ X be the j’th element to be covered by this algorithm and let (i, S) be the set
chosen to cover it. Suppose u was picked during the algorithm. Then since x is a fractional
cover of Y , fi(S)/|S ∩ Y | ≤ W/|Y |.
α(u) ≤ fi(S)/|S ∩ Y | ≤ W/|Y | = W/(|X| − j + 1)
On the other hand, if u was not picked by the algorithm, then α(u) ≤ W/(|X|− j′+ 1) ≤
W/(|X| − j + 1) for some j′ < j.
Summing over all u, we conclude that the integral cover has cost at most W log n. To
prove that this algorithm is also m-approximate, observe that each set selected has cost at
most W . Moreover, each agent is assigned at most one set in the final solution. This proves
the claim.
5.3 Vertex Cover
In this section, we consider the submodular vertex cover problem. We first prove an in-
formation theoretic lower bound of 2 − ε on the hardness of approximation in the single
agent setting and provide an algorithm with approximation ratio of 2. We present a 2 log n
approximation algorithm for the multi-agent case.
5.3.1 Single Agent Case
We are given an undirected graph G(V,E) and a normalized monotone submodular function
f : 2V −→ R. We wish to find a vertex cover U ⊆ V such that f(U) is minimized.
Theorem 33 For every fixed ε > 0, any randomized algorithm for the submodular vertex
cover problem with an approximation ratio of 2− ε needs exponentially many queries to the
value oracle.
Proof: Choose δ such that 2/(1 + δ) = 2− ε.
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Consider a bipartite graph G(A∪B,E) such that both A and B are of size n. The edge
set consists of n edges matching vertices in A to those in B. Let R be a random minimum
cardinality vertex cover of this graph, which can be picked by choosing one endpoint of
every edge uniformly at random.
Define the following two submodular cost functions.
f(S) = min
{
|S ∩R| + min
{





g(S) = min { |S|, n }
Note that the optimum value of the vertex cover for the function f is (1+δ)n2 , and for g
it is n. Thus if we can show that any randomized algorithm, cannot distinguish between f
and g with high probability, then it will imply an inapproximability ratio of 2/(1 + δ) or
2− ε for the submodular vertex cover problem.
From Observation 5.1.1 it suffices to show that for a deterministic query Q, Pr[ f(Q) 6=
g(Q) ] is exponentially small, where the probability space is defined over the random choice
of set R. Since f(S) ≤ g(S) for all S ⊆ V , f(Q) 6= g(Q) implies f(Q) < g(Q).
Let Q∗ be the optimal query for which Pr[ f(Q) < g(Q) ] is maximized. We will show
that |Q∗| = n. Suppose |Q| ≥ n, then
Pr[ f(Q) < g(Q) ] = Pr[ |Q ∩R| + min { |Q ∩R|, (1 + δ)n/2 } < n ],
which increases as the size of Q is reduced. Thus the size of the optimal query in this case
is n.
Now suppose |Q| ≤ n. In this case, it is not difficult to see that Pr[ f(Q) < g(Q) ] =
Pr[ |Q ∩ R| > (1 + δ)n/2 ], which increases as |Q| is raised. Therefore, the optimal query
size is n.
For |Q| = n, E[|Q∩R|] = n/2. Now it is not difficult to show using Chernoff like bounds
that Pr[ f(Q) < g(Q) ] = Pr[ |Q ∩ R| > (1 + δ)n/2 ] ≤ e−nδ2/3. Hence, the probability
that an arbitrary query Q can distinguish between f and g is exponentially small. 2
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Theorem 34 There exists an algorithm which finds a 2-approximate solution to the single
agent vertex cover problem with submodular costs.









xS ≥ 1 ∀(u, v) ∈ E








ye ≤ f(S) ∀S ⊆ V
ye ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E
Here the variable xS is an indicator variable for the set S of vertices. It is not difficult to









is a submodular function, and we can use the submodular minimization algorithm as a
subroutine to construct a separation oracle for the dual. This allows us to find an optimal
fractional solution to the LP3 with value OPT. Let x∗ be this solution. Output Q ={






as the vertex cover. Clearly, for any (u, v) ∈ E, either∑
S:u∈S x
∗




S ≥ 1/2 must hold, thus Q is a valid vertex cover of G. Since







We are given an undirected graph G(V,E) and a normalized monotone submodular function
fi : 2V −→ R for each agent i. We wish to find a vertex cover U ⊆ V such that f(U) is
minimized.
Theorem 35 Any randomized algorithm for the multi-agent submodular vertex cover prob-
lem with an approximation ratio c log n for some constant c < 1 needs exponentially many
queries to the value oracle.
Proof:
We will sketch the idea behind the proof, which is based on the hardness result for CRA
(Theorem 31). We will use a suitable instance graph such as the one used in the proof
of Theorem 33, and fix a vertex cover Q. We will then assign a very high value to fi(S)
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for any S that contains a vertex from V − Q and for all i. Essentially, the problem then
reduces to that of assigning vertices in Q to various agents so as to minimize the total cost.
Notice that this situation looks exactly like a CRA problem. Therefore, we can now build
a hardness example of the kind constructed in the proof of theorem 31 treating Q as the
ground set. 2
2 log n-approximate algorithm: We begin by finding an optimal solution x using the
LP relaxation LP5. Let Q =
{







be a vertex cover. We will
















xi,S ≥ 1 ∀(u, v) ∈ E
xi,S ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ V, ∀i
At any step of the algorithm let R contain the uncovered elements in Q. For any frac-












Pick u ∈ Q that minimizes α2x(u). Among the sets containing u, choose a set (i, S) ran-
domly with probability proportional to xi,S . Remove all the newly covered elements from
R and iterate until all the elements in Q are covered. Let y denote this integral cover.
Let u1, u2, ... be the order in which the vertices in Q get covered. We claim that
E[αy(uj)] ≤ W/(|Q| − j + 1). Suppose uj was picked during the algorithm. Then,
E[αy(uj)] ≤ α2x(uj). Since 2x covers the remaining |Q| − j + 1 elements in Q, α2x(uj) ≤
W/(|Q| − j + 1). On the other hand, if uj was not picked during the algorithm, then
E[αy(uj)] = α2x(u′j) ≤ W/(|Q| − j′ + 1) ≤ W/(|Q| − j + 1)









α2x(u) ≤ W log n ≤ OPT · 2 log n
This algorithm can be derandomized using standard techniques.
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5.4 Perfect Matching
In this section, we consider the multi-agent submodular minimum perfect matching problem.
In this problem we are given a bipartite graph G(V,E) containing at least one perfect
matching and a normalized monotone submodular function f : 2E −→ R+. We wish to find
a perfect matching in G of minimum value. We prove an information theoretic lower bound
of Ω(n) on the hardness of approximation for this problem and give an algorithm matching
this bound.
As in previous sections, we proceed by designing two submodular functions that are
hard to distinguish in polynomially many queries but have different optimal values. In the
general framework outlined in section 5.1, this is accomplished by ‘hiding’ a random element
of the target collection C in one of the functions. In this case, C is the set of all perfect
matchings. Choosing a random matching from C however does not serve our purpose. For
a fixed pair of edges, the events that these edges belong to the random matching are not
independent precluding the use of Chernoff bounds. We address this problem using the
following result on random graphs [8]:
Lemma 36 Let G(n, n, p) be a random bipartite graph on 2n vertices such that each edge
is present independently with probability p. Then
Pr[ G(n, n, p) contains no perfect matching ] = O(ne−np)
Essentially, we hide a collection of randomly and independently chosen edges that con-
tains a perfect matching with high probability. The above lemma extends to many linear
properties of random graphs, such as the spanning trees studied in the next section, and
allows us to extend our results to those properties.
Theorem 37 For every fixed ε, δ > 0, any randomized approximation algorithm for the
submodular minimum perfect matching problem with factor n1−3ε/(1+δ) needs exponentially
many queries.
Proof: Consider the graph G which is a union of nε different copies of the complete bipartite
graph Kn1−ε,n1−ε . Let Gi be the ith copy. In each copy Gi, we pick a random subset Ri
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of edges by picking each edge independently with probability p = 1/n1−2ε. Let R =
⋃
Ri.
By applying lemma 36 followed by the union bound, R contains a perfect matching with
probability 1−O(poly(n)e−nε).
Define the following two submodular cost functions f, g : 2E −→ R+:
f(Q) = min
{
|Q ∩R| + min
{








With probability 1 − O(poly(n)e−nε), R contains a perfect matching and hence the
minimum value of a perfect matching in f is (1 + δ)n3ε. Therefore the ratio of optima in g
and f is at least n
1−3ε
(1+δ) with high probability.
Now we look at the probability that the algorithm can not distinguish f and g. By
observation 5.1.1 it suffices to prove that Pr[f(Q) 6= g(Q)] is exponentially small for an
arbitrary query Q. It’s easy to see that f(S) ≤ g(S), thus these two functions differ on Q
if and only if f(Q) < g(Q).
Making arguments analogous to the proof of theorem 33, Pr[ f(Q) < g(Q) ] is maximized
when |Q| = n1+ε. Therefore,
Pr[ f(Q) < g(Q) ] = Pr[ |Q ∩R| > (1 + δ)n3ε ]
Since E[|Q ∩R|] = n3ε and we pick edges independently, we can apply Chernoff bounds to
conclude that this probability is O(e−n
2εδ2). This proves the theorem. 2
Factor n approximation algorithm for MS-MPM: We are given a graph G(V,E)
and submodular cost functions fi for each agent. Define a new weight function w over E as
we = mini fi({e}). Run the minimum weight perfect matching algorithm on G with weight
function w(Z) =
∑
e∈Z we for all Z ⊆ E to get a perfect matching M . Assign each edge
e ∈M to the agent i minimizing fi({e}). Let the cost of this solution be W .
Claim 38 M is an n-approximate solution to MS-MPM.
By submodularity we have W ≤ w(M). Let M0 be an optimal solution of MS-MPM
having value OPT. Since M is a minimum weight matching under w, w(M) ≤ w(M0). By
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submodularity of the cost functions, w(M0) ≤ n ·we. By monotonicity we have we ≤ OPT .
Therefore,
W ≤ w(M) ≤ w(M0) ≤ n · we ≤ n ·OPT
This proves the claim.
5.5 Spanning Tree
In this section, we consider the multi-agent submodular minimum spanning tree problem.
We are given a connected graph G(V,E) and a normalized monotone submodular function
f : 2E −→ R+. We want to find a spanning tree in G of minimum value. We prove an
information theoretic lower bound of Ω(n) on the hardness of approximationand also present
an algorithm matching this bound.
To prove the lower bound we will provide two submodular functions that can not be
distinguished in polynomially many queries and have widely differing optimal values. As in
Section 5.4, we will use the following lemma [8] in the proof.
Lemma 39 Let G(n, p) be a random graph on n vertices such that each edge is present
independently with probability p. Then
Pr[ G(n, p) is disconnected ] ≤ n(1− p)n.
Theorem 40 For every fixed ε, δ > 0, any randomized approximation algorithm for the
submodular minimum spanning problem on a with factor n1−3ε/(1 + δ) needs exponentially
many queries. Also there exists an algorithm that approximately finds an n-approximate
spanning tree in polynomially many queries.
Proof: For 1 ≤ i ≤ nε, let Gi be a clique on n1−ε vertices. Suppose there exists a vertex
v such that V (Gi) ∩ V (Gj) = {v} for any i 6= j. Let G =
⋃
Gi. We choose a random
subset of edges Ri, in each copy Gi, by picking each edge independently with probability
p = 1/n(1−2ε). Let R =
⋃
Ri. By applying Lemma 39 followed by the union bound, R is
connected with probability at least 1− ne−n2ε .
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Define the following two submodular cost functions f, g : 2E −→ R+:
f(Q) = min
{
|Q ∩R| + min
{








With probability 1−O(poly(n)e−nε), R is connected and hence, the value of the optimal
spanning tree in f is (1 + δ)n3ε. Therefore, the ratio of optimal solution values in g and f
is at least n
1−3ε
(1+δ) with high probability.
Making arguments similar to the proof of Theorem 37, we conclude that Pr[ f(Q) <
g(Q) ] = O(poly(n)e−n
ε
) for any query Q. By observation 5.1.1, this suffices to prove the
theorem.
Factor n approximation algorithm for MS-MST: We are given a graph G(V,E) and
submodular cost functions fi for each agent. Define a new weight function w over E as
we = mini fi({e}). Run Kruskal’s algorithm on G with weight function w(Z) =
∑
e∈Z we
for all Z ⊆ E to get a minimum spanning tree T . Assign each edge e ∈ T to the agent
i minimizing fi({e}). The proof that this constitutes an n-approximate solution follows
similar arguments as in the proof of Claim 38. 2
5.6 Discussion
The setting that we have considered in this work is quite general, and is a very exciting
avenue of research. There are many other interesting problems in this class like shortest
path, minimum cut, minimum edge cover etc which could be studied in the future work. We
have considered the covering problems in this contribution, one can ask the same questions
for packing problems like maximum matching.
One could also consider even more general functions like Subadditive functions. Exten-
sion to multi-agent makes a natural connection to Game Theory. Algorithmic mechanism
design of these combinatorial problem has interesting applications.
Another area of interest is the characterization of problems for which the computational
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networks,” in SODA, pp. 933–942, 2005.
[31] Iwata, S., “A faster scaling algorithm for minimizing submodular functions,” SIAM
J. Comput., vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 833–840, 2003.
[32] Iwata, S., “Submodular function minimization,” Math. Program., vol. 112, no. 1,
pp. 45–64, 2008.
109
[33] Iwata, S., Fleischer, L., and Fujishige, S., “A combinatorial strongly polynomial
algorithm for minimizing submodular functions,” J. ACM, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 761–777,
2001.
[34] Iwata, S. and Orlin, J. B., “A simple combinatorial algorithm for submodular
function minimization,” in SODA ’09: Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual ACM
-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 1230–1237, 2009.
[35] Jain, K., “Factor 2 approximation algorithm for the generalized steiner network prob-
lem,” Proceedings of FOCS, 1998.
[36] Kalyanasundaram, B. and Pruhs, K. R., “An optimal deterministic algorithm for
online b -matching,” Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 233, no. 1–2, pp. 319–325,
2000.
[37] Karp, R., Vazirani, U., and Vazirani, V., “An optimal algorithm for online bi-
partite matching,” in Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, 1990.
[38] Khot, S., Lipton, R., Markakis, E., and Mehta, A., “Inapproximability results
for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions,” Proceedings of WINE,
2005.
[39] Khot, S., “On the power of unique 2-prover 1-round games,” in STOC, pp. 767–775,
2002.
[40] Khot, S., Lipton, R. J., Markakis, E., and Mehta, A., “Inapproximability results
for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions,” Algorithmica, vol. 52,
no. 1, pp. 3–18, 2008.
[41] Khot, S. and Regev, O., “Vertex cover might be hard to approximate to within
2-epsilon,” J. Comput. Syst. Sci., vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 335–349, 2008.
[42] Krohn, E. and Varadarajan, K. Private Communication, 2007.
[43] Lahaie, S., Pennock, D., Saberi, A., and Vohra, R., Algorithmic Game Theory
(Nisan et al. editors), ch. Sponsored Search. 2007.
[44] Lau, L. C., Naor, S., Salavatipour, M., and Singh, M., “Survivable network
design with degree or order constraints.,” Proceedings of STOC, 2007.
[45] Lehman, B., Lehman, D., and Nisan, N., “Combinatorial auctions with decreasing
marginal utilities,” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce,
pp. 18 –28, 2001.
[46] Lenstra, J. K., Shmoys, D., and Tardos, E., “Approximation algorithms for
scheduling unrelated parallel machines,” Math. Programming, vol. 46, pp. 259–271,
1990.
[47] Mahdian, M., Nazerzadeh, H., and Saberi, A., “Allocating online advertisement
space with unreliable estimates,” in ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007.
110
[48] Mehta, A., Saberi, A., Vazirani, U., and Vazirani, V., “Adwords and generalized
online matching,” in FOCS, 2005.
[49] Mirrokni, V. S., Schapira, M., and Vondrák, J., “Tight information-theoretic
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